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RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
PLANS: BALKANIZATION, INTEGRATION,
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ABSTRACT
In deciding Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education
and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, the Supreme Court of the United States will likely
confront a critical issue to emerge from the lower court opinions on
voluntary integration plans: whether school districts that use race as a
factor in student assignment must comply with a legal requirement of
individualized consideration. The Court has imposed such a
requirement in other contexts, but it has not clearly explained what the
concept of individualized consideration means and why particular
forms of it matter.
This Article clarifies the meaning and function of individualized
consideration as both a concept and a legal requirement. After
defining the concept apart from any legal requirements, the Article
surveys the Court’s cases—from affirmative action in higher
education, to race-conscious redistricting, to affirmative action in
government contracting—in order to identify the principal concern to
which different requirements of individualized consideration respond.
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This survey reveals the key determinant of the type of
individualized consideration that the Court requires in a given
context: its judgment about how the use of racial criteria will likely
impact racial balkanization in America over the long run.
Accordingly, this Article assesses the constitutionality of the two plans
before the Court in light of this concern. The question is how the use
of race in student assignment affects balkanization.
After identifying three compelling interests that support raceconscious assignment plans, this Article recommends an
individualized consideration requirement that is modest in its
demands. This is because voluntary integration plans likely reduce
balkanization when school boards make only limited use of racial
classifications in granting or denying student requests for certain
schools and do not impose significant burdens on individuals and
families.
Finally, this Article applies the standard it proposes to the plans
before the Court. It concludes that the Seattle, Washington plan is
more suspect than the Jefferson County, Kentucky plan, but that both
likely meet the individualized consideration requirement that the
Court’s cases suggest is most appropriate in this setting.
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INTRODUCTION
Two cases before the Supreme Court of the United States during
its October 2006 Term may result in landmark rulings.1 They concern
the extent to which school boards may use racial criteria—whether
explicit racial classifications or implicit race consciousness—in
assigning students to schools on a nonmerit basis in order to advance
integration. The Court’s decisions “could affect hundreds of school
systems in all areas of the country.”2 Its rulings could also determine
3
the final legacy of Brown v. Board of Education in American society.
The stakes are enormous.
The interests potentially supporting race consciousness in
student assignment include (1) securing the civic, social, and
educational benefits thought to be associated with racially integrated
schools, (2) reducing minority student isolation in educationally
inferior schools, and, I will suggest, (3) expressively affirming the
value of integrated schools as an American moral ideal. The
threshold question before the Court is whether any of these interests
is compelling.
If the Court answers affirmatively, another key question is
whether school districts that use racial criteria in student assignment
violate a “right to individualized consideration without regard
4
to . . . race.” The latter issue will not prove decisive if the Court
concludes that none of the proffered interests is compelling. But if the
Court holds otherwise—and I argue that there is a strong basis for so
holding—then the Court will likely confront whether to apply a socalled “individualized consideration” requirement as part of the
narrow tailoring inquiry. This issue is “perhaps the most important
one to emerge from the lower court opinions on voluntary integration
plans,”5 and it has generated great confusion. Even courts that agree

1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No.
05-915).
2. Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factor in School Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2006, at A1.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978).
5. James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
327, 341 (2006).
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on the constitutionality of race-conscious assignments disagree about
6
whether school districts must afford individualized consideration.
The district court in Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, the case involving Jefferson County, Kentucky,
determined that it had to decide whether the assignment plan
“incorporates some sufficient form of individualized attention.” The
court “conclude[d] that it does” because the “assignment process
focuses a great deal of attention upon the individual characteristics of
a student’s application, such as place of residence and student choice
7
8
of school or program.” The Sixth Circuit approved this reasoning.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the case involving Seattle,
Washington, concluded that “if a noncompetitive, voluntary student
assignment plan is otherwise narrowly tailored, a district need not
consider each student in an individualized, holistic manner.”9 The
court so held because “the dangers that are present in the university
context—of substituting racial preference for qualification-based
competition—are absent here.”10 The dissent argued that raceconscious assignment plans must afford individualized consideration
of merit and other contributions to general diversity because “equal
protection requires the District to focus upon the individual’s whole
make up, rather than just a group’s skin color; this protects each
student’s right to equal protection under the law.”11
This dissensus is unsurprising. The Supreme Court has imposed a
legal requirement of individualized consideration in several decisions,
but it has not clearly explained what the concept of individualized
consideration means and why particular forms of it matter. In this
Article, I clarify the meaning and function of individualized
consideration as both a concept and a legal requirement. I first define
the concept apart from any legal requirements. I then survey the

6. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “voluntary integration plans” and “raceconscious student assignment plans” interchangeably.
7. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 858–59 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
8. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
9. 426 F.3d 1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5,
2006) (No. 05-908).
10. Id. at 1181.
11. Id. at 1212 (Bea, J., dissenting). The First Circuit agrees with the Ninth. See Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). No other
circuit has weighed in since Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003).
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Court’s cases in order to identify the principal concern to which
different legal requirements of individualized consideration respond.
Finally, I assess the constitutionality of the voluntary integration
plans before the Court in light of this concern.
In Part I, I explain what it means conceptually for government to
afford individualized consideration. It is critical to begin with a
definition because it is easy to confuse the concept itself with
particular legal requirements in particular settings, and because jurists
and commentators sometimes press a false distinction between
individualized consideration and consideration of group
characteristics.
In Part II, I turn from the concept of individualized consideration
to the legal requirements articulated by the Court. I examine various
contexts in which government uses racial criteria for the benefit of
racial and ethnic minorities, and I identify the rationales animating
the Court’s imposition of particular kinds of individualized
consideration requirements in these settings. The presence or absence
of one variant of individualized consideration, a variant rooted in a
partial appreciation of the virtues of color consciousness, caused
Justice Powell to endorse only certain affirmative action admissions
programs in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 The
Court’s insistence on compliance with this same type of individualized
consideration requirement distinguished its approval of affirmative
action admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger13 from its rejection of them in
Gratz v. Bollinger.14 I revisit Powell’s opinion in Bakke, drawing upon
Paul Mishkin’s pathmarking analysis of Powell’s account of
15
I then analyze the role of
individualized consideration.
individualized consideration in Grutter and Gratz, noting the close

12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
15. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1983). Mishkin anticipated the
view that sometimes “appearances do matter” in constitutional law. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
647 (1993). See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1236 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 693 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and
Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2002);
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
506–07 (1993); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74–76 (2003).
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correspondence between Robert Post’s reading of these decisions in
16
his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review and Mishkin’s
interpretation of Bakke two decades earlier.
Despite suggestions to the contrary,17 I show that a requirement
of individualized consideration does not disable government from
treating people in part as members of racial groups in every context in
which government would like to use racial criteria. Government
lawfully treats individuals in part as members of racial groups in the
context of affirmative action in higher education and elsewhere,
including race-conscious redistricting. No notion of individualized
consideration is thought to be implicated in reapportionment, even
when government constitutionally uses racial criteria, on the ground
that redistricting is a process in which government sorts groups of
people, not individuals. I suggest that this understanding is incorrect.
Government affords individualized consideration in the context of
reapportionment by determining whether individuals meet the
selection criteria for inclusion in a given district based on their
relevant characteristics. As for the legal requirements, the de facto
prohibition on using race as “the predominant factor”18 functions as
an individualized consideration requirement because it polices the
extent to which government may deem racial criteria to be relevant
criteria.
I next demonstrate that in another area of equal protection
jurisprudence—affirmative action in government contracting—the
Court has imposed a different sort of individualized consideration
requirement, one sounding in a constitutional commitment to
19
colorblindness. Thus, although courts sometimes seem to assume
that individualized consideration carries one specific set of legal
requirements, the requirements set forth in the Court’s cases are in

16. Post, supra note 15, at 68–76.
17. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17,
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (asserting that the
district “fails to treat individual students as individuals, which is a fatal flaw under the Court’s
cases”).
18. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show . . . that
race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision.”).
19. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (“The
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”).
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fact context-sensitive. At times, individualized consideration permits
a good measure of color-conscious state action when government
distinguishes among people based on relevant criteria, but only if
government creates the appearance of a good measure of
colorblindness. At other times, individualized consideration requires
government to act in a colorblind fashion.
My scrutiny of the case law suggests that the type of
individualized consideration required in a given context turns on the
Court’s judgment about how the use of racial criteria is likely to
impact racial balkanization in America over the long run.
“Balkanization” references the extent to which Americans identify as
members of separate racial or ethnic groups that view one another
with hostility.20 The Court, I submit, has implicitly rendered the
judgment that two factors determine the level of balkanization in
American society: (1) the effect of using racial criteria on the
condition of racial and ethnic minorities, and (2) the effect of using
racial criteria on the degree of hostility present in members of the
racial majority. The Court has sought to reduce balkanization by
registering simultaneously that “race unfortunately still matters”21 in
America and yet that racial criteria “may balkanize us into competing
22
racial factions.” It has endeavored not “to perpetuate the hostilities
that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.”23
I turn in Part III to race-conscious student assignment plans and
suggest that the critical question is whether and when the use of race
in student assignment exacerbates or ameliorates racial balkanization
in America. The answer depends on the interests that school districts
advance when they use race and the extent and impact of such use.
I first explain why the Court should conclude that voluntary
integration plans advance a compelling interest. School districts have
a compelling interest in ensuring that public schools fulfill their
primary mission. Both the Court and commentators have instructed
that in addition to facilitating academic achievement, public schools
are charged principally with socializing students to values of
assimilation, national unity, and social harmony, and thus to the ideal

20. To balkanize is “to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and often hostile
units.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 87 (10th ed. 2001). The Justices
conceive the concept this way. See infra notes 22–23, 97–98, 245–47 and accompanying text.
21. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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that Americans of every race and ethnicity must learn to live
together. The interests that school boards can advance by integrating
their schools are compelling because they are closely tied to the basic
mission of public education in America.
I next argue that the kind of individualized consideration
required by the Court’s cases depends on how voluntary integration
plans likely affect racial balkanization over the long term. I
recommend an individualized consideration requirement that is
modest in its demands because such plans can be expected to reduce
balkanization so long as they make only limited use of racial
classifications in granting or denying student requests for particular
schools and do not impose significant burdens on individuals and
families. Analyzed according to the three-part standard that I
recommend, the Jefferson County plan likely meets the
individualized consideration requirement that is most appropriate in
this setting. The Seattle plan presents a closer case because of the
greater burdens it may impose, but it too likely meets the
requirement.
I. DEFINING INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION
Several of the Court’s equal protection opinions use the term
“individualized consideration,” but they do so without defining the
concept. This lack of clarity can affect the quality of legal analysis by
conflating relevant differences and encouraging false distinctions. I
therefore begin with a definition.
Whenever government seeks to accomplish an objective that
requires it to distinguish among individuals—whether granting
admission to a public university, awarding a government contract,
placing persons in a legislative district, collecting census data, or
assigning a student to a public school—government must articulate
relevant criteria. These criteria may include standardized test scores,
grade point averages, financial bids, political affiliations, places of
residence, race, preferences for particular schools, and many other
things. It is by applying the relevant criteria that government
distinguishes among individuals.
Conceptually, and putting aside constitutional law for the
moment, “individualized consideration” means that government must
determine whether a given individual meets the selection criteria by
examining all of the individual’s relevant characteristics or
circumstances, not just one characteristic that (like all individual
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characteristics) is also a group characteristic. Whenever a government
decision requires choices among individuals, this same two-step
process is implicated: first government establishes the selection
criteria; then it affords individualized consideration to the extent that
it determines whether individuals meet these criteria based on all of
their relevant characteristics.
Definitionally, therefore, individualized consideration entails
assessing an individual’s relevant characteristics against a standard of
measurement. This is sometimes a purely mechanical exercise,
requiring no discretionary choices. An example is determining
whether a person lives within certain legislative boundaries. At other
times, step two is highly discretionary. An example is deciding whom
to hire to a law school faculty.
The key normative question in any setting is implicated at step
one: determining what the selection criteria should be. For example,
are standardized tests and bidding wars unfair to economically
disadvantaged individuals? Does a perfect grade point average from
school A convey the same information as a perfect grade point
average from school B? Turning to constitutional law, one of the most
controversial normative questions in many settings is whether and
when government may deem race a relevant selection criterion.
What should not be controversial, however, is the basic analytical
point that the concept of individualized consideration is perfectly
consistent with the consideration of group characteristics, including
race. Government cannot govern through generally applicable laws
without distinguishing among individuals based on group
characteristics; the criteria—any criteria—are defined by groups. For
example, every potential criterion discussed above (test scores,
grades, race, etc.) is both an individual characteristic or circumstance
and a group characteristic or circumstance. Government distinguishes
among individuals by valuing certain group characteristics over
others. Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest that individualized
consideration necessarily includes a requirement of near
colorblindness and thus is in serious tension with the consideration of
race.24 If a public theater company were to perform a play on the life
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the company would afford
individualized consideration in selecting the best actor for the lead
24. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 17, at 16–17 (criticizing the Jefferson County Board of Education for not “minimizing the
use of race in its assignment plan and maximizing the concept of individualized consideration”).
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role, and this consideration would likely entail using race as a
selection criterion.
Again, the normative task is to decide which criteria are relevant
to government’s choices among individuals. This task includes
determining whether government should choose based on one
criterion or multiple criteria, whether race may operate as one
criterion, and if so, what weight race should be given and whether this
weight may be publicly declared. Each of these questions is
analytically separate from the existence of individualized
consideration as a concept; nothing in the definition itself indicates
whether government constitutionally may consider race. Rather, the
extent to which race may be considered turns on the kind of
individualized consideration that the Court deems the Constitution to
require.
The Court has spoken to this issue several times, and its answers
have been context-sensitive. I begin with the cases concerning
affirmative action in higher education. They involve the use of racial
classifications to achieve certain social benefits, and the Court’s
insistence on individualized consideration originates with them. Not
coincidentally, this is a context in which the Court’s attention to racial
balkanization has driven the formulation of legal doctrine.
II. LESSONS OF THE PAST
A. Justice Powell’s Requirement of Individualized Consideration
The story of individualized consideration as a legal requirement
begins with the case in which the Court first addressed the
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education, Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.25 At issue was a challenge to the
admissions program of the medical school of the University of
California at Davis. The program openly set aside sixteen spots for
26
minority applicants out of a class of one hundred. The Court divided
three ways—four to one to four—and Justice Powell wrote the
controlling, singular opinion.

25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For further discussion, see Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel,
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 23–52), available at
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001588/01/95_Cal._L._Rev._(2007).pdf.
26. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Powell rejected the argument that the use of racial classifications
in affirmative action programs should not trigger strict scrutiny. He
concluded that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
27
examination.” He also resisted the University’s attempt to justify
affirmative action in higher education using the remedial logic of past
28
discrimination. Instead, Powell focused on the “academic freedom”
of universities to choose a student body that would ensure “‘wide
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation
of many peoples.” He thus developed a rationale for affirmative
action in higher education that would allow universities to fulfill their
“mission” of selecting “those students who will contribute the most to
the ‘robust exchange of ideas.’”29 Powell conceived this kind of
diversity as serving a compelling educational interest.
On Powell’s account, diversity in higher education did not imply
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the
student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected
ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
30
important element.

Powell concluded that universities could use “race or ethnic
background” as a “‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,” but could not
use race to “insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats.”31 That latter approach would deny
each applicant his or her “right to individualized consideration
32
without regard to . . . race.”

27. Id. at 291.
28. See Brief of Petitioner University of California, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 189474, at *8–10, *13.
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). Powell believed that this academic freedom of universities was of First
Amendment concern. Id.
30. Id. at 315.
31. Id. at 317. Powell thought that such an admissions program was “flexible enough to
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily
according them the same weight.” Id.
32. Id. at 318 n.52.
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By contrast, a program that gave individuals a “plus” for their
race
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The
applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another
candidate receiving a “plus” on the basis of ethnic background will
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have
included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the
other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly
and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of
33
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Powell concluded that “[s]o long as the university proceeds on an
individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial
34
interference in the academic process.” He would approve affirmative
action programs even if universities paid “some attention” to the
35
numbers of minority students they admitted. The Davis program,
however, set aside a certain number of slots for the admission of
racial minorities. Thus, the program unconstitutionally created “the
functional equivalent of a quota system.”36
It may seem curious that Powell’s rationale would approve
affirmative action programs only if they complied with the legal
requirements of a system of “individualized consideration,” even
though such a system would produce almost the same “net operative
37
results” as explicit “set-aside[]” plans. Paul Mishkin, who had

33. Id. at 318.
34. Id. at 319 n.53.
35. Id. at 323.
36. Id. at 318. Although Mr. Bakke won his case, Powell’s opinion preserved affirmative
action in higher education. Because affirmative action admissions programs did not need to use
the features that Powell deemed fatal, Bakke’s primary effect, “by far, was to sustain raceconscious special admissions programs throughout the nation.” Mishkin, supra note 15, at 921–
22.
37. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 928. Mishkin explained why, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, there is little functional difference between “‘plus’-type” and “set-aside” systems:
If an admissions committee is allowed to give a “plus” for race as a means of
achieving diversity in the student body, that “plus” must be large enough to make a
difference in the outcome in some cases. But if that is so, isn’t it clear that the size of
the “plus” will determine the number of minority students admitted? In those
circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that the authorities that determine the size of
the “plus” will set that size in terms of the number of minority students likely to be
produced at the level set.
Id. at 926.
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drafted the University’s brief, explained this puzzle by suggesting that
“[e]ven when the net operative results may be the same, the use of
euphemisms may serve valuable purposes; . . . they may facilitate the
38
acceptance of needed measures.” Specifically, “[t]he indirectness of
the less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages”
in terms of “the felt impact of their operation over time”:
The description of race as simply “another factor” among a lot of
others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense
that minority students are separate and different and the recipients
of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and
structured systems might have the opposite effect. These
perceptions . . . . can facilitate or hamper the development of
relationships among individuals and groups; they can advance or
retard the educational process for all—including, particularly,
39
minority students whose self-image is most crucially involved.

“Indirectness,” Mishkin wrote, may also help to mute public
resentment of racial preferences:
The use of overt numbers . . . greatly tends to trigger the symbolism
of . . . exclusionary devices of past invidious . . . discrimination. The
incorporation of such features . . . tends continually to keep alive
consciousness of the program and the relevance of race therein; it
tends to maintain and exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these
efforts to overcome the effects of past racial discrimination. A
program formulated along the lines Justice Powell’s opinion
approves would, by the very lack of “sharp edges,” avoid such
visibility in its operations and tend to enhance the acceptability of
40
the program.

Regarding both the students enrolled and the public at large,
different kinds of affirmative action programs would affect preexisting social beliefs about racial issues in critically different ways,
even when they produced virtually identical results.41
38. Id. at 927–28.
39. Id. at 928.
40. Id.
41. John Jeffries has recorded similar observations:
If the advantages accorded racial and ethnic minorities are not explicitly stated, they
need not be explicitly undone. If adjustments are not announced and contested, a
steady progression of divisive debates can perhaps be avoided. The burying of racial
preferences in “plus” factors for certain individuals obscures and softens the sense of
injury that even the most dedicated proponents of affirmative action must
acknowledge will be felt by those who are disadvantaged for reasons they cannot
control.
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The unstable logic animating Powell’s distinction between
constitutional and unconstitutional affirmative action programs was
thus central to his attempt to craft “a wise and politic resolution of an
42
exceedingly difficult problem.” His decisive differentiation between
a quota and a “plus” factor enabled him “to equate race with other
variables” that “do not carry the same emotional freight as racial or
43
ethnic lines do.” He charged his individualized consideration
requirement with diminishing the potential of affirmative action to
“exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these efforts to overcome the
effects of past racial discrimination.”44
B. The Individualized Consideration Requirement of Grutter
and Gratz
Twenty-five years after Bakke, the Court revisited the
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education. In Grutter
45
v. Bollinger, the Court sustained the affirmative action admissions
program of the University of Michigan Law School.46 Because the
program used racial classifications, Justice O’Connor reiterated for
the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not
groups,” and thus that all “governmental action based on race—a
group classification long recognized as in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection
of the laws has not been infringed.”47 To protect this right, the Court
reaffirmed—in agreement with Justice Powell in Bakke—that racial
classifications trigger strict scrutiny,48 meaning that they “are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
49
governmental interests.” The Court then held—also seemingly in

John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (2003). Cf. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 149 (1996) (“[C]ontroversy has a price, and divisiveness takes
its toll. In race matters, the price may be too high to justify the supposed benefits of
transparency anyway.”).
42. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 929.
43. Id. at 924.
44. Id. at 928.
45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
46. Id. at 343–44.
47. Id. at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
49. Id.
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agreement with Powell—“that the Law School has a compelling
50
interest in attaining a diverse student body.” It so held because “a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
51
institutional mission.”
The Court determined that the Law School’s “proper
institutional mission” includes three goals, each of which depends on
a racially diverse student body for its realization. First, the Law
School “promotes learning outcomes” by producing lawyers trained
to function “as professionals” and prepared to work within “an
increasingly diverse workforce,” an objective whose attainment
52
requires legal education to facilitate “cross-racial understanding.”
Second, the Law School prepares “students for . . . citizenship” as part
53
of its “fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society,” a
purpose whose fulfillment requires “[e]ffective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our
Nation . . . if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”54
Third, the Law School trains “our Nation’s leaders,” a cadre that
possesses “legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” only insofar as “the
path to leadership [is] visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”55
Although the Court purported merely to be endorsing Justice
Powell’s rationale in Bakke,56 Robert Post has shown that the Grutter
Court’s understanding of diversity is distinctive. Because “Powell
conceptualized diversity as a value intrinsic to the educational process
itself,”57 and because most public institutions in America are not
58
designed to promote the “‘robust exchange of ideas’” characteristic
of a university education, “Powell’s explanation of the compelling
interest of diversity did not reach very far beyond the specific context
50. Id. at 328.
51. Id. at 329.
52. Id. at 330 (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
53. Id. at 331.
54. Id. at 332.
55. Id. The Court stressed that “[a]ll members of our heterogeneous society must have
confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training.” Id.
56. Id. at 325 (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”).
57. Post, supra note 15, at 59–60.
58. Id. at 60 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
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59
of higher education.” The Grutter Court, by stark contrast,
“conceives of education as instrumental for the achievement of
extrinsic social goods like professionalism, citizenship, or
60
leadership” —goods that many public institutions in America seek to
advance. Because “the Law School can have a compelling interest in
using diversity to facilitate the attainment of these social goods only if
there is an independently compelling interest in the actual attainment
of these goods,”61 these justifications seem pregnant with implications
well beyond university life.
The Grutter Court, unlike Powell in Bakke, “endorse[d] the
practice of affirmative action for university admissions in terms that
closely correspond to the reasons that actually sustain the practice.”62
These reasons were animated almost entirely by “the felt need to
remedy deep social dislocations associated with race.”63 The Court
nonetheless used the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny to limit
the de facto remedial options available. It stated that race-conscious
affirmative action programs (1) must “not unduly harm members of
64
any racial group”; (2) may be used only after a “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives”;65 (3) “must be
limited in time”;66 and (4) must afford “truly individualized
67
consideration.”
It is plain that the Court placed primary importance on the
fourth constraint. The Court adopted the individualized consideration

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 65.
63. Id. at 63. The Grutter Court thus invoked “our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality,”
539 U.S. at 338, even as it declined to rely on remedial concerns explicitly.
64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. The Court held that the University met this requirement by
satisfying the individualized consideration requirement. Id.
65. Id. at 339 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)). The
Court did not view this requirement as onerous. See id. (“Narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to
choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”).
66. Id. at 342. It is hard to justify a time limit unless the purpose of the program is remedial
or the purpose of the limit is to reduce the potential for racial balkanization. The interests that
the Court attributed to the Law School are not time-sensitive. See infra notes 128, 273, 294.
67. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. The Court conceived individualized consideration itself as
prohibiting quotas. Id. (“[T]ruly individualized consideration demands . . . . that universities
[not] establish quotas for members of certain racial groups . . . .”). Sometimes courts present the
ban on quotas as a separate requirement of narrow tailoring.
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requirement from Powell’s opinion in Bakke, making “no
68
independent effort to explain or justify” it, even though the Court’s
articulation of the Law School’s compelling interests focused more
specifically on race than Powell had. The Court simply mandated that
“a university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a
way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application.”69 The Court declared that “[t]he importance of
this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious
70
admissions program is paramount,” despite the fact that its
identification of the Law School’s compelling interests appeared to
“point in the opposite direction from an individualized consideration
71
requirement.” If the Court was prepared to accept that the Law
School requires a racially diverse student body in order to advance its
compelling interests in professionalism, citizenship, and leadership,
then it would seem sensible to conclude that the school “should
precisely and decisively focus on race to the extent necessary to
achieve these objectives.”72
Following Powell’s lead in Bakke, however, the Court used the
narrow tailoring inquiry to distinguish affirmative action programs
that evaluate “each applicant . . . as an individual” from those that
make “an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or
her application.”73 Thus the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger74 wielded the
individualized consideration requirement to invalidate the University
of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program, which
awarded “20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant
solely because of race.”75
As with Powell’s opinion in Bakke, it may seem difficult to
explain what the Court in Grutter and Gratz was seeking to
accomplish by insisting that universities afford a certain kind of
individualized consideration to applicants. The Grutter Court

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Post, supra note 15, at 69.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
Id.
Post, supra note 15, at 69.
Id. at 70.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Id. at 270.
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declared that universities could use affirmative action to assemble “a
76
critical mass of underrepresented minority students,” which meant
the quantity of minority students needed to achieve “the educational
77
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.” Thus, universities
must “be free to regard race as an especially salient dimension of
diversity.”78 This freedom, however, “seems inconsistent with the
constitutional requirement that they treat applicants as unique
79
persons rather than as members of racial groups.” As Mishkin
80
noted, universities cannot use race to “assemble a critical mass of
minority students unless race is the defining factor in a student’s
81
application, even if it is ‘decisive’ only at the margins.”
Accordingly, the Court in Gratz likely invalidated Michigan’s
undergraduate affirmative action program “because the program
accorded to race the ‘specific and identifiable’ value of twenty
82
points.” But because the Court upheld the Law School’s program,
“which assigns race the specific value necessary to achieve a critical
mass of minority students,” the fatal flaw of the undergraduate
program must have been that the University made this value
“‘identifiable.’”83 The implication is reminiscent of Powell’s logic in
Bakke: if both programs “assign the same ‘specific’ value to race . . .
and if the undergraduate program does so explicitly and the Law
School implicitly, the former is unconstitutional, but not necessarily
the latter.”84 By allowing universities to use race as a factor in
ensuring a critical mass of minority students only to the extent that
the exact size of this factor is unknown to the public, the Court
effectively held that universities can engage in affirmative action but
must occlude the extent to which they do so.
Post accounts for this repudiation of transparency in much the
same way that Mishkin did in analyzing Powell’s opinion in Bakke:

76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335.
77. Id. at 330. The Court deferred to the Law School regarding the need for a critical mass.
Id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a
‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in
securing the education benefits of a diverse student body.”).
78. Post, supra note 15, at 72.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 37.
81. Post, supra note 15, at 72.
82. Id. at 73 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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“the twenty-point bonus sends a message to applicants and to the
world that being a member of a racial group is worth a certain, named
amount, and it therefore invites members of that group to feel
85
entitled to that amount.” Mishkin might have added that such a
visible bonus invites resentment.86 But “[t]he potential for
balkanization is muted within the Law School program . . . because
the value assigned to race is camouflaged by an opaque process of
implicit comparisons.”87 Although transparency is a core virtue of the
rule of law,88 the Court in the Michigan cases, like Powell in Bakke,
89
made a virtue of opacity.
The late Rehnquist Court registered that there were compelling
reasons “for using affirmative action programs to address the social
90
dislocations of race,” but it also feared that racial entitlements would
encourage balkanization. The Court thus applied strict scrutiny
so as to minimize the likelihood of racial balkanization by requiring
affirmative action programs to accord symbolic priority to
individuals, as distinct from racial groups, through the ideological
assertion that each candidate is receiving “individualized
consideration.” . . . Racial inequalities can be addressed, but only in
91
ways that efface the social salience of racial differences.

The use of racial classifications in university admissions might
exacerbate balkanization if such use were more apparent than
necessary to accomplish the objective at hand. The Court endorsed an
individualized consideration requirement that was designed to
ameliorate this concern.
Post, like Mishkin before him, focuses on the potential for
balkanization caused by public reactions to race-conscious
interventions by government. I suggest, however, that the

85. Id. at 74.
86. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
87. Post, supra note 15, at 74.
88. Id. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015–16 (2005) (discussing ruleof-law values). Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.”); id.
at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”).
89. Post, supra note 15, at 74.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 75.
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individualized consideration requirement of Bakke, Grutter, and
Gratz is actually rooted in a two-fold appreciation: while the use of
racial classifications might exacerbate balkanization if the magnitude
of such use were publicly apparent, inequalities in part responsible for
extant balkanization would go unaddressed if government were
disabled from using race.92
The above discussion does not mean, however, that the Court in
Grutter and Gratz cared only about public perceptions. Stressing the
importance of appearances is likely the most persuasive way to
reconcile these decisions. But in neither case would the Court have
allowed the University to use racial classifications as much as it
wanted even if it had maintained proper appearances. For example, if
the Law School had defined critical mass as, say, a 40 or 50 percent
minority student population, the Court almost certainly would have
invalidated its program. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with
the Grutter Court was not over whether race could be used explicitly,
but over whether it had in fact been used too much.93 He read Powell
in Bakke as allowing the use of “race as one, nonpredominant factor
in a system designed to consider each applicant as an individual,” a
use that was “modest” and “limited.”94
C. Redistricting and Contracting
Although never explicitly stated by the Court, the basic function
of the individualized consideration requirement of Bakke, Grutter,
and Gratz is to allay “the fear of racial ‘balkanization’”95 by reducing
social controversy over affirmative action while simultaneously
sustaining the constitutionality of legislative redress for the present
effects of past discrimination. The Justices sought to achieve this

92. I express no view here on whether it is of paramount importance to maintain fidelity to
such rule-of-law values as transparency in all circumstances, or whether rule-of-law virtues are
appropriately trumped at times by other values and purposes of law, including the need for law
to legitimate itself and the need to maintain social cohesion. For a theorization of the problem,
see Post & Siegel, supra note 25. Similarly, I do not inquire whether the Court and
commentators have overstated the importance of appearances in constitutional law. A critic
might argue that citizens are able to “pierce the veil” and to apprehend that there is little
functional difference between, say, a quota and a “plus” for race whose size is not identified
publicly.
93. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I reiterate
my approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context . . . .”).
94. Id. at 387. Justice Kennedy stressed that “individual consideration” ensures “that race
does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.” Id. at 393.
95. Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 691.
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balancing act by insisting that government use racial classifications in
a way that is both limited and less apparent than it might otherwise
be. In so insisting, the Court symbolically endorsed an ideological
commitment to individualism when government was in fact treating
people in part as members of racial groups in order to redress
enduring social dislocations ultimately related to past racial
96
injustices.
The Court explicitly spoke to the importance of social
appearances in the area of legislative redistricting. Writing for the
Court in Shaw v. Reno, Justice O’Connor revealed the Court’s hand
in a way that she declined to do in Grutter:
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls. . . . By perpetuating such notions, a racial
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting
that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract.
The message that such districting sends to elected representatives
97
is equally pernicious.

Because “appearances do matter,” one way to characterize the
difference between Grutter and Gratz is that in Gratz the University

96. Social acceptance of affirmative action in higher education plainly mattered to Justices
Powell and O’Connor. They likely believed that the institution served important societal
interests, see generally Jeffries, supra note 41, and they may have wanted to avoid triggering a
legislative backlash. Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101
HARV. L. REV. 395, 396 (1987) (“Perhaps most vivid in my mind is the acute appreciation that
[Powell] has always shown for the delicate and profoundly important legacy of Brown v. Board
of Education.” (emphasis added)). Justice Powell was exquisitely attuned to the importance of
public acceptance of governmental action on racial questions:
Our people instinctively resent coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects their
children and the opportunities that only education affords them. It is now reasonably
clear that the goal of diversity that we call integration, if it is to be lasting and
conducive to quality education, must have the support of parents who so frequently
have the option to choose where their children will attend school.
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993) (citations omitted).
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had created a scheme of using racial criteria that the Court feared
98
might “balkanize us into competing racial factions.”
No concept of individualized consideration is thought to be
implicated in the context of reapportionment. This is because
redistricting, by its very nature, is a process in which only groups of
voters, not individuals, are considered in drawing district lines
regardless of whether race comes into play. This understanding,
however, confuses government’s establishment of the selection
criteria (the first step identified in Part I) with government’s
determination of who meets these criteria (step two, which concerns
individualized consideration). In redistricting, controversy surrounds
the issue of which criteria—especially race—should be deemed
relevant, not whether a particular individual meets the criteria. The
criteria, once established, can be applied mechanically (that is,
99
without exercising discretion): one is either in the district or is not.
But because government places the individual in one district or
another based on all of the relevant selection criteria, the conduct of
government in the reapportionment process meets the definition of
individualized consideration.
The Court has policed the extent to which government may use
race as a selection criterion by holding that strict scrutiny is triggered
when the plaintiffs
show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape
and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within
or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,

98. Id. at 657.
99. In terms of the exercise of discretion, the distinction between redistricting and
university admissions is far from crisp. Groups of applicants with high (or low) test scores and
grades receive little or no consideration of their other attributes—they are near automatically
admitted (or rejected). Such consideration primarily occurs regarding applicants in the middle
group, who are also the most likely to be helped or hurt by the existence of the affirmative
action program. In both contexts, the people who are clearly in or out based on factors other
than race—whether street address or grades—receive little consideration of their other qualities
or circumstances but are also not affected by the use of racial criteria.
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contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
100
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.

The notion of race as the predominant factor, though used by the
Court to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny (and not as part of
101
the application of strict scrutiny ), is a kind of individualized
consideration requirement because it functions to prevent
government from using race too much as a proxy for political
interests. Indeed, Justice Kennedy explicitly used the “predominant
factor” language in Grutter.102
In a different equal protection context, the Court demands that
government not use race as a proxy at all when individualized
consideration is feasible. The Court makes robust use of this
colorblindness conception of individualized consideration in the
context of affirmative action in government contracting. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,103 the Court applied strict scrutiny and
struck down a city plan that required prime contractors awarded city
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar
amount of each contract to one or more Minority Business
Enterprises (MBEs).104 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor
stressed the importance of “an individualized procedure” in this
setting:
Since the city must already consider bids and waivers on a case-bycase basis, it is difficult to see the need for a rigid numerical
quota. . . . [T]he Richmond Plan’s waiver system focuses solely on

100. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (emphasis added). In Easley v. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234 (2001), the Court wrote that in order to establish that race and not politics
predominated
where majority-minority districts . . . are at issue and where racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with
traditional districting principles. That party must also show that those districting
alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance.
Id. at 258.
101. It is not clear whether this doctrinal distinction makes much of a relevant difference.
The Court has never held that a redistricting scheme uses race as “the predominant factor” but
survives strict scrutiny. Several Justices, however, have assumed or suggested that the
predominant use of race in redistricting would be constitutional when necessary to remedy past
discrimination or to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
982–83 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 992 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
103. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
104. Id. at 511.
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the availability of MBE’s; there is no inquiry into whether or not the
particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the
105
effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors.

The Court appeared to say that government should not use race at all
because the only defensible interest that could possibly be implicated
(in Croson, remedying the effects of prior proven discrimination)
could be advanced through individualized consideration.106 Suspecting
107
that Richmond had created a racial spoils system, the Court
subordinated the social salience of race; it deemed individualism and
merit paramount. The Court crafted constitutional principles that it
believed were animated by “[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens
in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
108
achievement.”
105. Id. at 508 (citations omitted). In this passage, Justice O’Connor referenced Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), a case in which the Court sustained a federal law requiring localgovernment recipients of federal public works monies to set aside 10 percent of the funds for
minority-owned businesses, id. at 492. Fullilove almost certainly has not survived Croson and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), a contracting case in which the Court
held that strict scrutiny also applies to federal affirmative action. Besides Fullilove, the only
other case in which the Court has upheld a set-aside is United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987), which involved a court-ordered remedy for proven discrimination, id. at 153.
106. Cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238 (“[U]nresolved questions remain concerning the details of
the complex regulatory regimes implicated by the use of subcontractor compensation clauses.
For example, the [law’s] 8(a) program requires an individualized inquiry into the economic
disadvantage of every participant, whereas the . . . regulations implementing [another law] do
not require certifying authorities to make such individualized inquiries. And the regulations
seem unclear as to whether 8(d) subcontractors must make individualized showings, or instead
whether the race-based presumption applies both to social and economic disadvantage.”
(citations omitted)).
107. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 495–96, 510–11 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 505–06 (majority opinion). The Court recently stressed the importance of a
similar kind of individualized consideration in holding that strict scrutiny controls an equal
protection challenge to a state prison policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells for
up to sixty days each time they enter a new correctional facility:
Indeed, the United States argues . . . that it is possible to address “concerns of prison
security through individualized consideration without the use of racial segregation,
unless warranted as a necessary and temporary response to a race riot or other
serious threat of race-related violence.” As to transferees, in particular, whom the
[state] has already evaluated at least once, it is not clear why more individualized
determinations are not possible.
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (citation omitted). Likewise, Justice Stevens,
who would have “h[e]ld the policy unconstitutional on the current record,” id. at 517 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), rather than remanding for application of strict scrutiny, concluded that “the
[state] has failed to explain why it could not, as an alternative to automatic segregation, rely on
an individualized assessment of each inmate’s risk of violence when assigning him to a cell in a
reception center,” id. at 521. The context is different from Croson and Adarand, but the
Johnson Court also seemed to insist on individualized consideration in a colorblind sense. Not
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D. The Pattern in the Case Law
The case law permits a generalization. When government makes
distinctions among people based on relevant criteria, the legal
requirement of individualized consideration insists that government
not overuse race: it must not treat individuals “too much” as members
of racial groups, whether by literally overusing race or by needlessly
impressing upon them and others that it is treating them in part as
members of racial groups. What varies by context is the Court’s
answer to the question of how much use of race is too much. At one
extreme, not using race too much imposes few constraints. At the
other, not using race too much means not using race at all.
Considering the foregoing strands of equal protection doctrine
together, it is possible to discern a pattern regarding the kind of
individualized consideration (IC) that the Court demands. The key
consideration, I suggest, is the Court’s judgment about how
government’s use of race is likely to impact racial balkanization in
America over the long run. I capture the pattern in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Effect of Perceived Potential for Greater Balkanization on
Court’s Allowance of Using Race as a Selection Criterion
minimum risk of
increasing balkanization

IC imposes few limits
on using race

maximum risk of
increasing balkanization

IC requires that race
not be overused

IC requires that race
not be used

At the left end of the spectrum are cases in which the Court
views the robust—indeed, potentially exclusive—use of race as a
selection criterion as compatible with the legal requirement of
individualized consideration, either because such use will reduce
balkanization by providing a constitutional remedy for race-based
wrongs, or because the use of race is functional and will not cause
balkanization. In United States v. Paradise, a remedial example, the
Court upheld a federal court order that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety hire or promote a qualified African American every
using race as a proxy for the state’s interest in security likely means not using race at all, except
in an emergency.
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time it hired or promoted a white person as a remedy for proven
109
racial discrimination. Functional uses of race include collecting
racial statistics like census data110 or responding to a social emergency
111
like a prison race riot. In these functional instances, race is the only
selection criterion, and yet there is no violation of the individualized
consideration requirement. Also likely in the functional category
would be a preference for Arab Americans when the purpose was to
select undercover agents who would infiltrate a Middle Eastern
terrorist organization.
Toward the middle of the continuum are the cases in which the
use of race possesses the potential both to reduce pre-existing
balkanization and to exacerbate balkanization by distinguishing
among people along racial lines. An example is affirmative action in
higher education. The Court in this setting insists that government
not overuse race as a factor in admissions. This insistence includes a
requirement that the use of race be no more salient than necessary.
By attending to symbolic considerations and to the compromising of
conventional notions of merit, the Court frees itself to give legal voice
to its recognition of the social benefits associated with affirmative
action admissions. In allowing the discreet use of race, the Court
expects that the net effect on balkanization in American society will
be negative because universities will ameliorate a balkanizing status
quo (which exists when they enroll few minorities) without provoking
severe racial hostilities and increasing balkanization on balance. The
Court does not appear very concerned about the individual burdens
imposed by affirmative action in this setting, perhaps because
compliance with the individualized consideration requirement eases

109. See supra note 105.
110. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 18 (2003) (“[C]ourts seem to
act on the belief that a group-based classification must inflict some dignitary or distributive
harm to violate the anticlassification principle when they uphold the use of race in census or
suspect descriptions on the ground that the classification is permissible because it merely
describes social realities.”).
111. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[O]nly a
social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison
race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an exception to the principle
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (citations omitted)).
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the felt impact of the burdens, and because the consequences of not
112
gaining admission to a specific school are seldom severe.
The Court also seeks to prevent the overuse of race in
redistricting. The predominant factor test in effect prohibits
government from using race too much in drawing district lines. The
idea of merit is irrelevant in reapportionment and the social benefits
of empowering minorities to cast a more effective vote are at least
partially offset by the social costs of reducing the voting power of
whites placed in majority-minority districts. Accordingly, the Court
seems concerned about the burdens imposed on certain groups of
white voters by the use of race and especially about the balkanizing
113
message that race-conscious redistricting can send.
Toward the other end of the continuum, for instance where
affirmative action in government contracting is at issue, the Court
requires compliance with an individualized consideration requirement
that precludes government from using race as a selection criterion in
choosing among individuals. The Court seems most attracted to this
approach in contexts where conventional notions of merit are socially
salient, the use of race imposes definite burdens on individuals, and
the Court suspects that government is using race in the service of a
balkanizing racial politics rather than in the public interest.
Judging from the case law, therefore, the type of individualized
consideration required by the Court turns on a judicial judgment
about the probable net effect of using racial criteria on balkanization
in American society. Because balkanization is no doubt a
phenomenon that is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, this
114
judgment is likely resistant to empirical falsification. Such a
judgment is also relative because intergroup hostility is always a
matter of degree. The Court does not—indeed, cannot—articulate
what degree of racial hostility is constitutionally unacceptable, but it

112. It is also true that any given white applicant suffers only a modest decrease in his or her
chances of being admitted by virtue of the existence of the program. See generally Goodwin Liu,
The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1045 (2002). Whether white applicants perceive the situation this way, however, is another
matter. For whites in the middle range of applicants, moreover, the existence of the affirmative
action program has a greater impact on their chances of gaining admission. See supra note 99.
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. This is not to say, however, that judgments about balkanization are merely intuitive,
impressionistic, and thus incapable of rational persuasion. See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the
potential for balkanization in the context of voluntary integration plans relative to affirmative
action in higher education).
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does seem consistently concerned about whether the use of racial
criteria is likely to make matters better or worse on balance.
There is a temporal dimension to this determination. The Court
seems attuned to the net impact on racial balkanization over the long
115
haul. For example, the Court no doubt anticipated that the race116
conscious remedies mandated by Brown v. Board of Education
would increase interracial hostility in the short run because of white
resistance. The Court, however, likely believed that these costs were
acceptable in part because it expected that dismantling a regime of
apartheid would encourage a long-term reduction in balkanization.117
Another difficulty is that the same use of racial criteria may
cause race-based hostility to increase among members of one racial
group and to decrease among members of another racial group. For
example, an affirmative action program may cause more resentment
among some whites but less resentment among some minorities than
would exist in the absence of the program. No decision rule is
available to explain how the Court’s judgment about balkanization
proceeds in these circumstances. The Court seems to make an allthings-considered determination regarding the overall effect of using
race on balkanization, a determination whose principal focus varies
depending on the circumstances. When invidious discrimination on
the basis of race has been proven, the Court is more concerned about

115. Of course, the long run cannot be so long that the exercise in anticipating balkanization
becomes entirely speculative. Accordingly, concerns about a short-term increase in
balkanization when government uses race cannot be overcome by only a remote possibility of
gains in the distant future.
116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. To be sure, a noninstrumental moral judgment animated the Court in Brown I and
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). I submit, however, that a long-term instrumental judgment about
balkanization was also implicated in Brown. After all, Brown I said nothing of implementation,
and Chief Justice Warren campaigned for unanimity in order to reduce Southern resistance. See
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 686 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975) (“Warren did
not want dissents or concurrences if he could help it.”). Put differently, if the Brown Court had
been persuaded that the country would never accept the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), it is unlikely that Brown would have come out the way that it did. This
suggestion may make some squeamish about the notion of balkanization as a normative
criterion, but its descriptive accuracy helps to explain where constitutional law comes from, how
it legitimates itself, and why it changes over time. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005) (“This seismic shift in Brown’s
status—from a much-criticized ruling that divided public opinion to a sacrosanct decision that is
well-nigh universally applauded—may suggest that the Court’s legitimacy flows less from the
soundness of its legal reasoning than from its ability to predict future trends in public opinion.”);
see also infra notes 134–35.

02__SIEGEL.DOC

2006]

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT

809

the potential hostility among members of minority groups if
government does not allow explicit use of racial criteria in providing a
remedy. In educational settings and redistricting, the Court seems
concerned about ameliorating the potential hostility among members
of all racial groups. In government contracting, the potential hostility
among whites appears paramount.
The Court’s judgment about the net effect of using racial criteria
on balkanization seems to depend on several considerations. One is
the Court’s view of the symbolic message conveyed by the use of race.
The Court can be “uncomfortable”118 with robust expressions that
“race matters” because it views them as potentially self-fulfilling:
when government stresses the significance of race, this may cause
citizens and public officials to act in ways that render race more
salient. The country would then move farther away from the ideal of
an America in which race no longer matters in public life. As Parts
II.A and II.B demonstrated, this concern animated the Court’s
distinction between racial quotas and the use of race as a “plus”
factor in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz. And as Part II.C showed, the
Court explicitly invoked this concern in the contexts of redistricting
and government contracting.119
Another consideration apparent from the cases is the Court’s
view of the burdens that using race imposes on individuals. Racial
classifications that impose substantial burdens on individuals by
virtue of their membership in certain racial groups are particularly
likely to cause race-based hostility. Thus the Court in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education120 invalidated a board of education’s
effort to increase teacher diversity in its schools by laying off certain
white faculty with greater seniority than certain African American
teachers who were retained.121 Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell
underscored the burdens involved in using race as a criterion of job
termination. “[A]s a means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise
may be legitimate,” he stated, “the Board’s layoff plan is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. Other, less intrusive means of
accomplishing similar purposes—such as the adoption of hiring
goals—are available.”122 Individual burdens that attract the Court’s

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See id.; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283–84 (footnote omitted).
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attention tend to be tangible and distributive, as in Wygant, but they
123
may also be dignitary, as in the several affirmative action cases in
which certain Justices opine that racial classifications are inherently
124
demeaning.
The Court also considers the extent to which consideration of
individual merit is possible. The Court seems concerned about what it
regards as the unfairness of distorting a competitive process of
evaluation, whether the relevant merit-based qualifications are
grades, as in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, or the ability to submit a low
bid on a government contract, as in Croson and Adarand. Such
concerns are not always paramount (or even implicated) in the case
law, but when consideration of individual merit is possible and the
Court regards the social benefits of using race as small, the merit
factor can be important.
Also significant is the degree to which the Justices believe that
the use of race would facilitate the realization of significant social
benefits. Such benefits might accrue because race or ethnicity is
functionally central to some contemporary, important purpose of
government that has no relation to balkanization—for example,
selecting Arab American agents to infiltrate certain terrorist
organizations or compiling racial statistics or census data. But the use
of race could also secure significant social benefits by remedying the
social dislocations of race and thus reducing balkanization that preexists the current use of racial classifications (and is often related to
the past use of very different kinds of racial classifications). In such
circumstances, the Court has been prepared to register that America
is a society “in which race unfortunately still matters.”125 The more the
Court deems it important to allow sensitivity to social problems either
caused in part by a history of racial apartheid or related to the
broader salience of race in our increasingly multiracial society, the
less the Court will demand in terms of an individualized consideration
requirement that limits the ability of government to use race as a
selection criterion. Remedies for de jure segregation are apt

123. See supra note 110.
124. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on
race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
125. Id. at 333 (majority opinion).
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examples. So are Paradise and the previously documented remedial
logic that partially animates Bakke and Grutter. When, by contrast,
the Court believes that the use of race will likely increase
balkanization, it demands compliance with an individualized
consideration requirement that prohibits government from using race
as a selection criterion at all. Croson and Adarand illustrate this
126
phenomenon.
The above considerations—expressive message, individual
burdens, relevance of merit, and social benefits—collectively
determine the Court’s view of the likely net effect of using racial
criteria on balkanization and thus the kind of individualized
consideration that it requires. Accordingly, these factors determine
127
where a case falls along the continuum shown in Figure 1.
The foregoing analysis suggests a striking relationship among
anticipated balkanization, individualized consideration, and
government’s use of race as a selection criterion. The Court’s view of
the likely long-term effect of using race on balkanization determines
the kind of individualized consideration that it requires, which in turn
polices the extent to which government may use racial criteria as
relevant criteria in distinguishing among individuals.
Of course, some of the considerations discussed in the previous
pages are ordinarily categorized in the doctrine as elements of narrow
tailoring, and individualized consideration is typically conceived as
just one element of narrow tailoring. But my interpretation of the
doctrine suggests that something else is going on: what the Court says
128
it is doing to ensure a proper fit is often being done to minimize
126. One might suggest that I have repeatedly referenced “the Court” when I am really
referencing the idiosyncratic influence of Justice O’Connor. Her Grutter opinion, however,
attracted five votes. Justice Breyer, moreover, joined all but the last sentence of her
concurrence in Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). More importantly, there is nothing unique about the influence of Justice
O’Connor. Whenever the Court is divided five to four in an area, the possibility exists that one
Justice will control outcomes. See Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 14 n.46, on file with the author) (“[T]he Court is
not a unitary actor.”). When this happens, the majority opinions remain those of the Court, not
of one Justice. In any event, my framework provides a way to understand the Court’s decisions
regardless of whether the views of a particular Justice drove them.
127. Figure 1 reduces a multi-dimensional problem to one dimension because a concern
with balkanization underlies the Court’s consideration of each factor.
128. The Court has stated that narrow tailoring requires the means to “‘fit’” the compelling
end “‘so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). The analysis of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz in Part
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balkanization, so that the other components of the narrow tailoring
inquiry serve the same function as the individualized consideration
requirement.
This reading of the doctrine reveals the error in the assertion that
controlling principles of equal protection prohibit government from
treating individuals as members of racial groups.129 Colorblindness is
not a reasonable interpretation of the case law because it collapses
the context-sensitive continuum defined by the Court’s decisions. The
claim animating the colorblindness position is either that the level of
racial balkanization in American society is irrelevant to constitutional
analysis, or that the only source of balkanization that matters is social
hostility to racial criteria. Neither assertion can be reconciled with the
Court’s decisions.130
Indeed, colorblindness discourse cannot make sense of even the
most settled constitutional understandings. In the student assignment
cases before the Court, for example, the United States has declared
that it “remains deeply committed to th[e] objective” of
“effectuat[ing] a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
131
system.” But from the colorblind perspective that heavily influences
132
the federal government’s briefs, it is not clear why the use of race to
remedy even proven de jure school segregation is constitutionally
permissible. If equal protection means that government must not
treat individuals as members of racial groups (except perhaps in an
emergency), and if a race-conscious remedy burdens individual
students who are not guilty of racial discrimination and benefits
individual students who may not have been victims of racial

II, however, shows that the narrow tailoring inquiry constrains the use of racial criteria in ways
that have nothing to do with “fit” and that are instead responsive to the potential for racial
balkanization. See supra note 66; infra notes 273, 294.
129. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At
the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the
government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious
groups.”).
130. Of course, some Justices and commentators disagree with the normative premise of this
Article and reject the Court’s relevant decisions as constitutionally authoritative.
131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (quoting
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)).
132. But see infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (noting the view of the United States
that the interest in avoiding minority student isolation is “unquestioned” and “undoubtedly
legitimate and important”).
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discrimination, as remedies for de jure segregation typically do, then
the use of race in remedying the constitutional violation ought to be
ruled out of bounds. Because almost everyone approves the use of
race in this context, and because those who do not would be
ostracized from the interpretive community if they said so publicly, it
follows that a commitment to colorblindness does not accurately
capture the circumstances in which race-conscious state action
comports with equal protection.
The Court has deemed permissible the use of race to remedy de
jure segregation, even when innocent individuals are burdened and
nonvictims are helped, in part because the Court expects that such
use will reduce balkanization over the long run (even if it may
provoke fierce resistance in the short run) by dismantling the primary
historical cause of such balkanization.134 But if this is right, it is not
evident why the Court should restrict such a judgment to instances of
135
de jure segregation. And in fact the Court has not done so.
I turn now to race-conscious student assignment plans. The key
question is where such plans lie along the balkanization continuum in
Figure 1. The answer depends on (1) the interests supporting the
136
plans and (2) the extent, impact, and salience of the use of race.
133. Cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 110, at 24 n.53 (“To apply Brown in a meaningful way,
courts had to invalidate school assignment practices in districts where there was some degree of
racial mixing in school attendance patterns.”).
134. If resistance persists, however, the Court eventually pulls back. See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 181–85
(2004) (reporting that white opposition and conservative judicial appointments limited increases
in interracial contact during the post-Brown era); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 110, at 29
(“Beginning in the 1970s the federal courts . . . slowed the project of disestablishing racial
hierarchy, thus achieving a compromise on race relations that large numbers of whites sought.”);
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1475 (2004) (“The debates over Brown’s
implementation show the complex ways in which concerns about legitimacy have moved courts
to mask and to limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in the affairs of the powerful
on behalf of the powerless.”).
135. I do not examine why the Court has employed balkanization as a normative criterion of
constitutional judgment in its equal protection jurisprudence. Elsewhere I have explored this
question with Robert Post. See Post & Siegel, supra note 25 (theorizing the dialectic between
legal legitimacy and public legitimacy). I merely suggest here that the primary considerations
appear to have been the need for the Court to preserve the preconditions of its public
legitimation over time, as well as a felt responsibility to reduce social conflict over racial issues.
See id.; supra note 96 (quoting Justices Powell and O’Connor); supra note 134 (quoting Reva
Siegel’s historical work on race and legitimation); Siegel, supra note 134, at 1544–46 (discussing
the legitimacy concerns that pervade constitutional discourse on equality).
136. The Court’s concerns about balkanization are relevant under both prongs of strict
scrutiny. The Court is more likely to view an end as compelling if it believes that pursuing the
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III. CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT
A. Compelling Interest
1. Two Voluntary Integration Plans. School districts that use
race as a factor in student assignment typically assert that racially
integrated schools (1) confer civic, social, and educational benefits of
great importance and (2) reduce minority student isolation in
137
educationally inferior schools.
For example, the case involving the Jefferson County Public
Schools (JCPS) in Kentucky concerns the constitutionality of the
school board’s “managed choice” plan. It requires, with a few
exceptions, that all elementary, middle, and secondary schools “seek
a Black student enrollment of at least 15% and no more than
50%, . . . reflect[ing] a broad range equally above and below [the
138
34%] Black student enrollment systemwide.” The plan categorizes
students into integrated attendance zones, called “resides areas,” and
uses the zones in making initial assignments. The plan then permits
students to express preferences among schools and programs within
the zones. Students who are not satisfied with their initial assignment
or preference-based placement can request a transfer within or
beyond their attendance zone. Before considering a student’s race,
the JCPS makes assignments based on “place of residence, school
capacity, program popularity, random draw and the nature of the
student’s choices.”139 The racial guidelines are used mostly at the
elementary school level, though they also apply to transfer requests at

end will reduce balkanization. And in evaluating which means are acceptable, the Court
implicitly insists that any race-conscious means chosen be no more balkanizing than necessary
to achieve the end.
137. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The negative
consequences of racial isolation that Lynn seeks to avoid and the benefits of diversity that it
hopes to achieve are rooted in the same central idea: that all students are better off in racially
diverse schools. We therefore restate the interests at stake here as obtaining the educational
benefits of a racially diverse student body.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). Under the Lynn,
Massachusetts plan, which the Court declined to review before Justice O’Connor retired, see
supra note 11, “each student is entitled to attend his or her neighborhood school. Students who
do not wish to attend their neighborhood school may apply to transfer to another school.
Approval of a transfer depends, in large part, on the requesting student’s race and the racial
makeup of the transferor and transferee schools,” Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6.
138. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
139. Id.

02__SIEGEL.DOC

2006]

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT

815

every level and to high school freshmen who apply for “open
140
enrollment” at a school outside their residential area.
According to the district court, the plan reflects the “JCPS’s
ongoing commitment to racial integration within its individual
141
schools.” Chief Judge Heyburn described the school board’s
interests as sounding in the virtues of integration, perhaps in part
because the district had been subject to a desegregation decree from
1975 until 2000:
The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education has generated much discussion regarding whether that
ruling has fulfilled its original promise. To give all students the
benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to
maintain community commitment to the entire school system
precisely express the Board’s own vision of Brown’s promise. The
benefits the JCPS hopes to achieve go to the heart of its educational
mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2) better
appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students;
(3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader
142
community support for all JCPS schools.

The court determined that the Grutter Court’s emphases on
professionalism, citizenship, and leadership were equally relevant “to
143
students in racially integrated public schools.” It further determined
that “[o]ther benefits” sought by the school board were “quite
different from those articulated in Grutter” but “seem equally
compelling”—namely, “educational benefits for students of all races,”
including “academic achievement”144 and the creation of “a system of

140. Id. at 844–45. I omit discussion of specialized schools and programs not at issue in the
cases before the Court.
141. Id. at 840.
142. Id. at 836 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 853. According to the court, “[s]everal JCPS witnesses testified that, in a racially
integrated learning environment, students learn tolerance towards others from different races,
develop relationships across racial lines and relinquish racial stereotypes.” Id. “These values,”
the court reported, “carry over to their relationships in college and in the workplace. As a
result, these students are better prepared for jobs in a diverse workplace and exhibit greater
social and intellectual maturity with their peers in the classroom and at their job.” Id.
144. Id. The court did not “resolve th[e] ongoing debate” about the extent to which
integration benefits black students “in terms of academic achievement,” deferring instead to the
school board’s judgment that integration benefits all students academically because there were
“valid reasons for believing its policies have succeeded”—namely, that “[o]ver the past twentyfive years, White and Black students in JCPS have progressed by every measure.” Id. at 853–54
& n.39.
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roughly equal components, not one urban system and another
suburban system, not one rich and another poor, not one Black and
145
another White.” The court concluded that “the arguments favoring
the Board’s compelling interest are so objectively overwhelming” that
the question whether it would accord “deference” to the board’s
educational judgment was “immaterial.”146
In contrast to the JCPS, Seattle School District Number 1 has
never been adjudicated guilty of de jure segregation,147 and its “open
choice” race-conscious assignment plan applies only to secondary
schools. The plan allows incoming ninth-graders to select any of the
ten high schools in the district. The plan provides that if the racial
composition of an oversubscribed high school (i.e., a school that more
students want to attend than capacity allows) “differs by more than 15
percent from the racial make up of the students of the Seattle public
schools as a whole,” and “if the sibling preference does not bring the
oversubscribed high school within plus or minus 15 percent of the
District’s demographics” of 60 percent minority and 40 percent white,
then “the race-based tiebreaker is ‘triggered’ and the race of the
applying student is considered.”148

145. Id. at 854. “It creates a perception, as well as the potential reality, of one community of
roughly equal schools. Student choice and integrated schools, the Board believes, invest parents
and students alike with a sense of participation and a positive stake in their schools and the
school system as a whole.” Id.
146. Id. at 852.
147. The atmospherics of the two cases are different. While the McFarland court touted
integration, the Ninth Circuit stressed racial diversity. This may be because only the JCPS had
been subject to a desegregation decree, and the primary goal of its assignment plan was to
maintain integrated schools once the decree was lifted. Legally, however, this distinction would
not seem to make a relevant difference. It is certainly counterintuitive that the same state action
that was required by law before the decree was lifted became prohibited by law the moment
that decree was lifted. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 329 (“Have we reached a point of ‘terminal
silliness’ in constitutional law where school districts are prohibited from doing what federal
courts were ordering them to do just a few years ago?” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). But this rationale for “play in the joints” between what
equal protection requires and what it prohibits would seem to suggest not that the JCPS plan is
less suspect than the Seattle plan, but that neither is constitutionally dubious. Cf. Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004) (“[T]here are some state actions permitted by the
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”).
148. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908). After sibling
preference and race, “students are admitted according to distance from the student’s home to
the high school. . . . In any given oversubscribed school, the distance-based tiebreaker accounts
for between 70 to 75 percent of admissions to the ninth grade.” Id. at 1171.
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The Ninth Circuit described the school district’s interests as (1)
“the affirmative educational and social benefits that flow from racial
diversity” and (2) “avoid[ance of] the harms resulting from racially
149
concentrated or isolated schools.” As to the first set of interests, the
court approved the district’s expert testimony that a racially diverse
educational experience causes “improved critical thinking skills” for
students of all races; an “improvement in race-relations” and “the
reduction of prejudicial attitudes”; and the opening of “opportunity
networks in areas of higher education and employment,” as well as a
greater likelihood that graduates will “live in integrated
communities” and “have cross-race friendships later in life.”150
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he District’s interests in the
educational and social benefits of diversity are similar to those of a
law school as articulated in Grutter,” but the court also identified
reasons why “public secondary schools have an equal if not more
151
important role” in “‘preparing students for work and citizenship.’”
First, “underlying the history of desegregation in this country is a
legal regime that recognizes the principle that public secondary
education serves a unique and vital socialization function in our
democratic society.”152 Second, “a substantial number of Seattle’s
public high school graduates do not attend college. For these
students, their public high school educational experience will be their
sole opportunity to reap the benefits of a diverse learning
153
environment.” And third, “the public school context involves
students who, because they are younger and more impressionable, are
more amenable to the benefits of diversity.”154 The court deemed all
three “compelling educational and social benefits of [racial] diversity
155
unique to the public secondary school context.”
Regarding the second cluster of interests asserted by the District,
the Ninth Circuit noted the research indicating “that racially
concentrated or isolated schools are characterized by much higher
levels of poverty, lower average test scores, lower levels of student
achievement, with less-qualified teachers and fewer advanced

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1175 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)).
Id.
Id. at 1176 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1177.
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156
courses.” The court observed that “because of Seattle’s housing
patterns, high schools in Seattle would be highly segregated absent
race conscious measures.”157 It held the interest in reducing racial
158
isolation “clearly compelling.”

2. Analysis. In considering whether these courts are correct
that voluntary integration plans advance one or more compelling
interests, it is important to frame the proffered interests with some
precision. One type of diversity interest may not be as compelling in
the K–12 context as another. Regarding assignment plans, the alleged
interests concern integration or racial diversity, not general diversity
as in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.159
While Chief Judge Heyburn and the Ninth Circuit noted
important similarities and differences between voluntary integration
plans and affirmative action in higher education, the two courts
overstated the similarities in some respects. Race-conscious
assignment plans do not seek to secure viewpoint diversity to
anywhere near the extent that universities do. Nor are such plans
primarily concerned with maintaining a visibly open path to
leadership.160 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit appeared at times to
conflate the Grutter interest in general diversity with the public school
161
interest in racial diversity. These problems notwithstanding, both
courts properly concluded that voluntary integration plans advance
compelling interests.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 1178.
158. Id. at 1179.
159. Cf. generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990) (analyzing the problem of abstraction in
constitutional law).
160. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 335 (“[T]o the extent that Grutter and Gratz also rely on
viewpoint diversity, or on making sure that the ‘path to leadership’ is visibly open to all, those
decisions do not answer the precise question raised by voluntary integration plans at the public
school level.”). Yet universities may find it difficult to maintain a visibly open path to leadership
in the face of severe racial isolation in primary and secondary education. See infra notes 202–08
and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. This conflation is understandable
in light of the Grutter Court’s arguable inconsistency. It stated that it was adopting Justice
Powell’s general diversity rationale, but it in fact focused more specifically on racial diversity
than Powell had. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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a. The Mission of Public Education. The mission of public
162
education in American society includes instilling cultural values,
and school districts have a compelling interest in enabling their
schools to fulfill this mission. The Court has repeatedly stated that the
institution of public education is very special in light of the civic,
social, and educational functions it performs. The Court in Bethel
163
School District No. 403 v. Fraser insisted that “‘inculcation’” of “the
‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system’”164 is “truly the work of the schools.”165 The Court in
166
Plyler v. Doe declared that “[w]e have recognized the public schools
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government”;167 that “education provides the basic tools by
which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the
benefit of us all”; and that “education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society.”168 The Court in Ambach v.
169
Norwick proclaimed “[t]he importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the
preservation of the values on which our society rests.”170
Almost all would agree that public schools are charged with
educating students in the sense of empowering them to achieve
academically (e.g., teaching the “three Rs”). When one turns to
socialization, however, matters become more controversial. Although
there is always disagreement about the values that public schools
should be instilling, most would agree that they include (1) socializing
students to the value of individualism in the sense that citizens should
not be treated by government as members of racial groups, and (2)
socializing them to the value that “[a]ll members” of our racially and
ethnically “heterogeneous society”171 must learn to live together in
162. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 189 (1995) (observing that the “process of socialization . . . . most typically
occurs through institutions like the family and the elementary school”); id. at 190 (noting the
role of “the institution of coercive public education” in “instill[ing] [principles] in persons as
part of their socialization into community values”).
163. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
164. Id. at 683, 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
165. Id. at 683.
166. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
167. Id. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)).
168. Id.
169. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
170. Id. at 76.
171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
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172
peace and maybe even in harmony, so that “our society [can]
continue to progress as a multiracial democracy.”173 These values can
of course be in tension at times, but surely public schools can affirm
them both. A critical issue is which value predominates in public
education when they conflict.
One possible answer is socialization to the value that an
individual’s race or ethnicity is irrelevant in this country when
government imposes private burdens in pursuit of public benefits,
regardless of the degree and kind of these burdens and benefits and
regardless of the context. American public education is hardly
indifferent to the importance of valuing the unique qualities and
aspirations of each person and not treating people simply as members
of racial groups. As Justices Scalia and Thomas have expressed in
174
their affirmative action opinions, individualism in this sense is a
deeply embedded aspect of America’s collective commitments. In
dissent in the Seattle case, Judge Bea drew powerfully from this
cultural store:

The District’s use of the racial tiebreaker to achieve racial balance in
its high schools infringes upon each student’s right to equal
protection and tramples upon the unique and valuable nature of
each individual. We are not different because of our skin color; we
are different because each one of us is unique. That uniqueness
incorporates our opinions, our background, our religion (or lack
175
thereof), our thought, and our color.

In Judge Bea’s view, “[t]he District’s stark racial classifications . . .
176
offend intrinsic notions of individuality.” Because public schools are
principal sites of cultural reproduction,177 teaching individualism in

172. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. FOR REVIEW OF THE MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUC., CAL.
LEGISLATURE, CALIFORNIA FACES . . . CALIFORNIA’S FUTURE: EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP
IN A MULTIRACIAL DEMOCRACY, at ii, 7 (1989) (describing an “educational system [that]
liberates and sustains our capacity to live together” and “forge[s] a creative and productive
society of mutual respect and accommodation”).
173. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
174. See, e.g., supra note 124.
175. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1221 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
176. Id. at 1205.
177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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this sense has to be one facet of the function of public education in
178
America.
It is nonetheless difficult to reconcile such a vigorously
individualist understanding of the role of public education in America
with the Court’s past interpretations of American culture. As already
noted, when the Court has considered the institution of public
education, it has focused consistently on the values of democracy,
citizenship, and the public good. Public schools, the Court has
declared, are “the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion
179
The Court has
among a heterogeneous democratic people.”
repeatedly recognized the nation-building function of public
education, authoring this declaration of interdependence in Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
180
environment.

The Brown Court, after “consider[ing] public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in American life throughout
181
the Nation,” was explicit that the primary role of public education
in America is to advance the public good.

178. It was thus in a school case that the Court proclaimed: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943).
179. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948).
180. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
181. Id. at 492–93.
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182

In all of these cases and elsewhere, the Court has made clear
that the public good advanced by public education is not best
understood in primarily individualistic terms; rather, it has declared
that public schools socialize students to values of mutual
183
understanding, social cooperation, and social unity. Judge Kozinski
voiced a similar point in focusing explicitly on the value of racial
harmony:
[T]ime spent in school . . . has a significant impact on [a] student’s
development. The school environment forces students both to
compete and cooperate . . . . Schoolmates often become friends,
rivals and romantic partners; learning to deal with individuals of
different races in these various capacities cannot help but foster the
live-and-let-live spirit that is the essence of the American
experience. . . . Schools . . . don’t simply prepare students for further
education . . . ; good schools prepare students for life, by instilling
skills and attitudes that will serve them long after their first year of
184
college.

182. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (reaffirming
“our historic dedication to public education”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)
(“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”); id. at 221
(“[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing “the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded education and [the]
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.”).
183. Public schools are the primary institutions in America that instill such values across
racial and ethnic lines. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 181 (reporting that between 1976
and 2000, “[s]chools represented the most important source of contact for these [black and
white] young people. Two-thirds of blacks and more than one-third of whites said they had
gotten to know people of other races a lot in school. Next most important as venues for this
contact were employment, sports teams, and clubs, in that order.”); id. at 188 (“In light of the
high degree of residential segregation that characterizes most urban areas of the country,
schools are for most children the first opportunity to have significant contact with individuals of
other racial and ethnic groups.”). It is thus difficult to characterize the benefits alleged to be
associated with integrated schools as “a lesson of life,” not a lesson learned at school. Cf.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“For it is a lesson of life rather than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather
learned by, for it cannot be ‘taught’ in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and 20 years
younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions
ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.” (emphasis added)).
184. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1195 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5,
2006) (No. 05-908). In considering the import of Judge Kozinski’s reference to “romantic
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Chief Judge Heyburn deemed such lessons “pretty important for
185
most people who are fortunate enough to learn them early in life.”
These judicial interpretations are supported by any faithful
rendition of the history of American educational ideals. John Dewey
emphasized cooperative learning and engagement in his educational
philosophy. He began with the observation that “our chief business
186
with [the young] is to enable them to share in a common life.”
Alexander Bickel wrote in analyzing Brown that “the public
187
school . . . fails in its mission if it teaches the races separately.” He
characterized this mission as “equalizing, socializing, nationalizing—
assimilationist and secular,” and he traced “[t]he implication that the
public schools are charged with” this mission to “the history of public
education in the United States—or at least [to] the history of what
men have thought about public education in the United States.”188
Bickel cogently captured “[t]he full-blown conception of the public
school as a secular, nationalizing, assimilationist agent,” which “dates
more or less to the post-Civil War years of the great immigrations.”189
Amy Gutmann, to note one more example, argues that de facto
segregated schools should be integrated even when the majority
partners,” one might bear in mind the reasons for the Court’s controversial disposition of Naim
v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question a challenge to
a Virginia antimiscegenation statute despite its incompatibility with the equal protection
principles articulated in Brown). See Siegel, supra note 88, at 2017 (“Naim . . . . constituted a
rare accommodation that principle made with pragmatism for the ultimate purpose of
vindicating Brown’s promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more years, a significant—and
perhaps intolerable—cost, but at least principle put itself in a position not to lose the war.”
(footnotes omitted)). When the legitimacy of Brown was more secure, the Court unanimously
invalidated the Virginia law. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
185. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 n.35 (W.D. Ky.
2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). These statements resonate with the
admonition that “unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people
will ever learn to live together.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
186. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 8 (1916); see id. at 1 (“While the living
thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the energies which
act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into
smaller pieces . . . but loses its identity as a living thing.”).
187. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120–21
(1970).
188. Id. at 121.
189. Id. See POST, supra note 162, at 183 (noting the function of “authoritative cultural
institutions, like state educational systems, . . . to articulate the norms that reciprocally define
individual and social identity and inculcate these norms in a manner than spans social
divisions”).
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opposes integration. She regards de facto segregation as
“unacceptable by democratic principles even if it is often supported
190
by democratic politics.” She so concludes “for reasons that return us
to the main purpose of primary schooling: educating democratic
191
citizens.” The moral component of this education, Gutmann argues,
requires continuing efforts by government to reduce enduring racial
192
prejudice. It seems, therefore, that American public schools are
concerned less centrally with individualism and colorblindness and
more centrally with socializing students to values of racial and ethnic
harmony.193
Even if one disagrees about how these cultural commitments
trade off, the values of federalism suggest that school districts should
194
be afforded leeway to work out the relation between them. The
Court has instructed that “[n]o single tradition in public education is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to quality of the educational process.”195 Justice Kennedy in
particular has noted the “well established” understanding “that
education is a traditional concern of the States,” and he has submitted
that “the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed” when
“considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish [a]

190. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 162 (1987).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 752 (2004) (“In
some sense, the question [whether the Constitution permits voluntary race-conscious student
assignment to achieve diversity in public schools] should hardly seem vexing at all. The goal of
creating racially integrated learning environments resonates deeply with our ideal of the
common school and its mission of educating students for citizenship in a multiracial society. This
goal has particular importance given our historical experience with racial segregation.”).
194. For discussions of the values that federalism is commonly thought to serve, see
generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 56–59 (2005); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Neil S.
Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629
(2006); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341. For an overview of the
normative federalism debate in constitutional law and citations to the literature, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109–12 (2d ed. 2005).
195. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974).
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196
goal.” This is because “the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear.”197 In the context of voluntary
integration plans, where core and conflicting American ideals are
implicated, federalism values counsel judicial respect for the way in
which a school district prioritizes them.198

b. Whether Integration Advances the Mission. Even if school
districts have a compelling interest in fulfilling their mission, and even
if this mission, properly conceived, is more centrally concerned with
teaching cross-racial unity than with instilling colorblindness, it does
not necessarily follow that integrated schools actually advance this
mission. It is therefore important to consider the constitutional
significance of whether integrated schools do in fact produce civic,
social, and educational benefits.199
There is disagreement about whether racially diverse public
schools advance academic achievement among all students.200 It is
extremely difficult to establish causation in this context: isolating the
independent impact of each causal variable is a formidable challenge,
and there is no one phenomenon known as a racially integrated

196. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–81 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–42).
197. Id. at 581.
198. This is not an argument for deference to local control regardless of context. Rather,
deference is warranted when core and conflicting American educational ideals are at stake.
Racial segregation, which apparently still has its proponents, is not such an ideal. See Sam
Dillon, Law to Segregate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A9.
199. For a careful review of the literature examining the impact of interracial contact on
academic achievement, self-esteem, intergroup relations, and long-term educational attainment
and employment, see CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 186–96.
200. Compare Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School
Desegregation, Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12–20, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908;
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006), and Brief of the
American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–
13, Parents Involved and Meredith, with Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom &
Stephan Thernstrom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12–21, Parents Involved and
Meredith, and Brief of Drs. Murphy, Rossell & Walberg as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 8–13, Parents Involved, and David J. Armor, The End of School Desegregation
and the Achievement Gap, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 629, 653 (2001). Studies that have sought
to determine the effect of desegregation on student achievement “have come up with a
decidedly mixed set of results. In general, the research suggests no effect on mathematics
achievement for blacks and some modest positive effect on reading for blacks. The achievement
of whites does not appear to be harmed.” CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 187.
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201
school. Because the degree and kind of interracial contact in
American public schools vary tremendously even among racially
diverse schools, it is unsurprising that the evidence on academic
achievement is conflicting.
What has been empirically demonstrated, however, is that
racially isolated schools—specifically, public schools with high black
202
or Latino concentration—offer inferior educational opportunities.
203
Congress has rendered this judgment. And in its briefs attacking the
plans before the Court, even the United States labels the interest in
204
and
avoiding minority student isolation “unquestioned”
205
“undoubtedly legitimate and important.” This problem exists not
simply because racially isolated schools are more likely to be highpoverty schools, but because teacher quality is sensitive to racial
composition independent of other factors that affect teacher quality,

201. For an accessible discussion of some of the analytic difficulties, including omitted
variable bias and the enormous diversity of experiences signified by the terms “desegregation”
and “interracial contact,” see CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 194–96. See also McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5,
2006) (No. 05-915) (“The Court cannot be certain to what extent the policy of an integrated
school system has contributed to these [academic] successes.”).
202. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation,
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 200, at 28–40.
203. In the Magnet Schools Assistance Act, Congress stressed the importance of voluntary
efforts to secure the benefits of integrated schools and to reduce minority student isolation:
It is in the best interests of the United States—
(A) to continue the Federal Government’s support of . . . local educational agencies
that are voluntarily seeking to foster meaningful interaction among students of
different racial and ethnic backgrounds, beginning at the earliest stage of such
students’ education;
...
(C) to continue to desegregate and diversify schools by supporting magnet
schools . . . .
20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4) (Supp. III 2003). Congress stated that “[t]he purpose of this part is to
assist in the desegregation of schools served by local educational agencies by providing financial
assistance to eligible local educational agencies for,” among other things, “the elimination,
reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation in elementary schools and secondary
schools with substantial proportions of minority students, which shall include assisting in the
efforts of the United States to achieve voluntary desegregation in public schools.” Id.
§ 7231(b)(1).
204. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 131, at
7.
205. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at
15.
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206
Specifically, “[w]hite teachers—who
including school poverty.
comprise 85% of the teaching force—often transfer to schools with a
lower minority percentage.”207 Research shows that recognition of a
compelling interest in reducing racial isolation in public schools is not
premised on unconstitutional stereotypes and assertions of inherent
racial inferiority.208 Rather, the interest is based on the empirically
demonstrated reality that racially isolated schools afford inferior
educational opportunities in substantial part because experienced
white teachers decline to work in such schools for extended periods of
time.
Turning to the civic and social benefits alleged to be associated
with integrated schools, one might be inclined to think that a rigorous
empirical demonstration of benefits is unnecessary. It seems
intuitively plausible that a promising way to combat racial and ethnic
prejudice, stereotyping, and polarization is to have children of
different races and ethnicities spend productive time together at
school. Putting aside for the moment whether it is a lesson of social
209
science, it is a widely-shared lesson of life that time well spent with
people of different races and ethnicities helps to ameliorate the
ignorance and fear that fuel racialized and ethnocentric thinking.
There would seem to be much wisdom in Judge Kozinski’s words to
this effect:

It is difficult to deny the importance of teaching children, during
their formative years, how to deal respectfully and collegially with
peers of different races. Whether one would call this a compelling

206. See Brief of 19 Former Chancellors of the University of California as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05908; Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“[P]ublic
schools with high black or Latino concentration have serious difficulty attracting and retaining
high-quality teachers, and this problem is directly related to the racial make-up of schools
independent of other factors such as teacher salaries, school poverty, or student achievement.”).
Cf. Sam Dillon, Schools Slow in Closing Gaps Between Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at A1
(reporting the conclusions of experts and recent reports that poor teacher quality in racially
isolated schools is a principal cause of the persistent achievement gap between the races).
207. Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation,
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 200, at 31.
208. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he court
has read our cases to support the theory that black students suffer an unspecified psychological
harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational development. This approach
not only relies upon questionable social science research rather than constitutional principle,
but it also rests on an assumption of black inferiority.”).
209. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
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interest or merely a highly rational one strikes me as little more than
semantics. The reality is that attitudes and patterns of interaction
are developed early in life and, in a multicultural and diverse society
such as ours, there is great value in developing the ability to interact
successfully with individuals who are very different from oneself. It
is important for the individual student, to be sure, but it is also
210
vitally important for us as a society.

This view seems more substantial than “a faddish slogan of the
211
cognoscenti.” As Judge Bea wrote in dissent in the Seattle case,
“[t]he idea that children will gain social, civic, and perhaps
educational skills by attending schools with a proportion of students
of other ethnicities and races, which proportion reflects the world in
which they will move, is a notion grounded in common sense.”212
One might think it plausible to believe that racially integrated
schools confer important civic and social advantages, but still insist
that the alleged benefits are unproven. Although the virtues of
intergroup contact in public schools are evident to many educators
and citizens, and while hundreds of social scientists have concluded
that “racially integrated schools tend to provide benefits that are not
213
214
available in segregated schools,” these claims are in fact disputed.

210. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5,
2006) (No. 05-908).
211. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
212. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting).
213. Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation,
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 200, at 2. The civic and social benefits identified by social scientists include not only
academic achievement and cross-racial understanding, but also better life opportunities,
preparation for a diverse workforce, reduced residential segregation, and greater parental
involvement in schools. See id. at 2–28; Brief of 19 Former Chancellors of the University of
California as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 206, at 7–10; Brief of the
American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 200, at 5–9, 14–17; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,
296–307 (1999) (identifying various benefits of racial and socioeconomic integration).
214. See, e.g., Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 200, at 21–29; Brief of Drs. Murphy, Rossell &
Walberg as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 200, at 13–14; David J. Armor &
Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in BEYOND THE
COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 252 (Abigail
Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom eds., 2002). For a critique of the theory and empirics
associated with the “contact hypothesis” in the social sciences, see H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC
CONFLICT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 42–141 (1997).
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Some of the above statements are tautological: suggesting that
“productive” time and time “well spent” at school with persons of
other races and ethnicities will improve intergroup relations assumes
the conclusion that the time will be productive and well spent.
Whether the civic and social benefits alleged to be associated with
integration are in fact realized depends on what actually happens
when children of different races and ethnicities attend school
together, and the results can vary widely depending on the
circumstances of the interaction.215
The key legal question is what the Court should do in light of the
empirical uncertainty that is unavoidable given the complexity of the
world, the current state of knowledge, and the inherent limits of
social science.216 One option is to wield the Constitution to end local
democratic experimentation in search of workable solutions to
difficult problems. A more sensible approach is constitutionally to
cabin the kinds of experiments that school boards may conduct, but
nonetheless to allow them real room to take place—hopefully, with
care and caution and informed by social scientific knowledge of how

After reviewing the research on “the great social experiment of desegregation” in
America, Forbes writes that “if any simple conclusion can be drawn from more than a
generation of social science research on the attitudinal effects of desegregation, it is that no
simple conclusion about its effects is possible.” Id. at 61. Forbes describes the methodological
obstacles that impede empirical research: observing developments over a relatively long period
of time; securing the cooperation of a random sample of school officials, parents, and students;
using valid measures of racial attitudes; avoiding the contamination of attitude measures by
“history”; and avoiding the contamination of children’s responses by the opinions of parents and
teachers. Id. at 51. Yet Forbes distinguishes “short-term effects on attitudes,” which are “the
most important effects . . . [f]or testing the contact hypothesis,” from “longer-term effects, both
direct (for example, the effects of attending a desegregated school on the probability of
attending college or living in an integrated neighborhood) and indirect (the effect of the policy
itself on social norms and expectations),” which “must also be taken into account” in
“evaluating the policy of desegregation.” Id. at 56. Forbes favorably quotes research
documenting the “‘revolution in intergroup relations . . . since World War II.’” Id. at 56–57
(citation omitted).
215. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation,
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 200, at 2 (“Racially desegregated schools are not an educational or social panacea and the
extent of benefits will depend on how desegregation is structured and implemented.”);
CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 189 (“In schools using teams and emphasizing cooperative
work, for example, cross-race friendships are more common.”); id. at 190–91 (“Whites tend to
have more positive attitudes toward minority students when they associate with them on an
equal basis, and their views are more negative in situations where minority students have low
academic performance.”).
216. See supra notes 201, 214 and accompanying text.
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best to structure integrated environments—so long as local
constituencies continue to approve them.
217
If, as in Grutter, the Court is prepared to defer to a reasonable
educational judgment of the JCPS and the Seattle School Board on
the question of causation, then this issue will not doom the plans.
There is a reasonable basis in evidence for the educational judgments
218
219
of the school officials, even if some social scientists disagree.
Moreover, even if the Court were to repudiate Grutter’s deference to
state decisions regarding the admissions policies of its universities,
federalism values counsel judicial respect for the reasonable
judgments of locally elected school boards that integrated schools
220
secure the proffered benefits.
c. A Constitutive Compelling Interest.
It is particularly
appropriate for the federal courts not to eviscerate local autonomy in
the context of race-conscious assignment plans. This is because
ongoing voluntary efforts by school districts to integrate the nation’s
public schools are genuinely and primarily aimed at the social

217. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The
Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by
respondents and their amici.”). The Grutter Court also deferred on the issue of substantiation by
declining seriously to engage the empirical debate.
218. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) (“Not only does a plan that
promotes the mixing of races deserve support rather than suspicion and hostility from the
judiciary, but there is much to be said for returning primacy on matters of educational policy to
local officials.”), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); id. at 1196 (“When it
comes to a plan such as this—a plan that gives the American melting pot a healthy stir without
benefiting or burdening any particular group—I would leave the decision to those much closer
to the affected community, who have the power to reverse or modify the policy should it prove
unworkable.”); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J.,
concurring) (“[O]ne of the advantages of our federal regime is that different communities try
different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful
or seem to them best to suit their individual needs.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005); id. at 29
(“The problems that the Lynn plan addresses are real, and time is more likely than court
hearings to tell us whether the solution is a good one . . . .”); see also supra note 96 (quoting a
Powell opinion in a desegregation case); Liu, supra note 193, at 758–59 (“[A]fter several
decades in which the Court has repeatedly invoked local control to limit school desegregation, it
would be ironic, to say the least, if the Court now closed the door on locally driven efforts to
achieve racially integrated schools.”).
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221
transformation of race in America. The very telos of assignment
plans that pursue racial integration is to reduce balkanization by
teaching impressionable young Americans of all races and ethnicities
to learn and to work together as one people.
Indeed, this discussion reveals a compelling interest advanced by
voluntary integration plans that does not turn on matters of empirical
causation. Regardless of whether it can be proven empirically that the
alleged benefits of education in an integrated setting materialize to a
significant extent, a compelling interest exists in having school districts
affirm the value of education in an integrated setting. In other words,
school boards advance a compelling interest when they express a
message of integration—the message that Americans constitute one
people who learn and work together, not apart, and that government
should afford all students the same public educational opportunities
without racial separation. It is for this reason that young people
assigned to public schools pursuant to voluntary integration plans are
appropriately regarded as the twenty-first century children of Brown
222
v. Board of Education. The cases before the Court do not involve
remedies for de jure segregation, but they are very much about the
American moral ideal of integration that Brown has come to
symbolize.223 Not only does respect for local autonomy support the

221. There can be little doubt that the Court’s post-Brown equal protection jurisprudence
was suffused with concern to encourage the social transformation of race in America. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1963) (“But by placing a racial label on a candidate at
the most crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State
furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group
because of race and for another.”).
222. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Accord McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d
834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“Viewing voluntary school integration as an extension of the
Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence makes sense. In 1975, an integrated school
system and all the benefits it promised were thought so essential that various federal courts
required JCPS to create and maintain it. . . . It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal
protection, local control and limited deference are now only one-way streets to a particular
educational policy, virtually prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies once required by
law.”).
223. Regardless of whether Brown as originally understood was primarily about integration
or the end of state-mandated segregation, Brown has come to embody American ideals that
transcend the Court’s holding:
Integrated schools, better academic performance, appreciation for our diverse
heritage and stronger, more competitive public schools are consistent with central
values and themes of American culture. Access to equal and integrated schools has
been an important national ethic ever since Brown v. Board of Education established
what Richard Kluger described as “nothing short of a reconsecration of American
ideals.” What Kluger and others have articulated is that Brown’s symbolic, moral and
now historic significance may now far exceed its strictly legal importance. . . . Brown’s
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authority of school officials to express a message of integration, but
the interest advanced by such expression is compelling precisely
because the message engages the concern with balkanization that has
224
animated the Court’s decisions in every setting canvassed in Part II.
A key advantage of conceptualizing the compelling interest this
way is that it helps the interpretive community to focus on what is
primarily at stake in the constitutional debate over voluntary
integration plans. The controversy is first and foremost not
instrumental in nature, but constitutive. The central disagreement
concerns not whether a proposed policy will in fact achieve a set of
goals, but rather which elements of American collective identity
should prevail in an instance of genuine value conflict. Defenders of
the plans view integration as the enduring moral legacy of Brown, and
they conceive living together across racial and ethnic lines as essential
if America is ever going to be the kind of society that it strives to be.
Many critics of the plans view colorblindness—or, at a minimum, a

original moral and constitutional declaration has survived to become a mainstream
value of American education and . . . the [School] Board’s interests are entirely
consistent with these traditional American values. They reinforce our intuitive sense
that education is about a lot more than just the “three-R’s.”
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (quoting KLUGER, supra note 117, at 710). See Ryan, supra
note 5, at 336–37 (“[R]acially integrated schools carry forward what might be called the moral
ideal of Brown, namely that schools should not simply be desegregated but also integrated.”).
This moral ideal embodies the post-Brown judgment of “courts and federal officials, not to
mention a large segment of the public” and now communities around the nation “that black and
white [and Latino and Asian American] children should actually go to school together.” Id. at
336.
224. To be clear, the interests include both the benefits of education in an integrated setting
and affirmance of the value of an integrated setting. But they have different legal logics and
only the former can be falsified empirically.
In light of these interests (and the interest in reducing racial isolation), it would be
inappropriate to conclude that the school districts are “engaged in simple race balancing,”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting). Race balancing as an end in itself is “patently unconstitutional.”
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)
(“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Preferring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.”). But the interests
discussed here are not properly described as balancing “for its own sake.” See Comfort v. Lynn
Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Where a community does not seek racial diversity
for its own sake, but rather to advance a compelling interest in the educational benefits that
diversity provides, there is no absolute bar to pursuing racial diversity.”). It would therefore also
not be fair to say that the districts seek a racial “aesthetic.” Contra Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n.3
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I refer to the Law School’s interest as
an ‘aesthetic.’ That is, the Law School wants to have a certain appearance, from the shape of the
desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them.”).
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repudiation of racial classifications—as both the true legacy of Brown
and the embodiment of the sort of society that the nation should want
to be on matters of race regardless of who associates with whom.
Neither side is likely to be persuaded by contrary empirical evidence,
at least as long as the evidence remains open to reasonable
disagreement.225 Nor is the Court likely to decide the cases before it
based on empirics. Each side makes claims not merely on the
Constitution as hard law, but on the Constitution as the embodiment
of our “fundamental nature as a people,” which “is sacred and
226
demands our respectful acknowledgement.” Each side embraces
hallowed national ideals. And each of these ideals was “purchased at
the price of immeasurable human suffering.”227
If the Court concludes that a compelling interest supports the
plans before it,228 then the decisive issue becomes narrow tailoring. As
part of its inquiry, the Court will likely consider whether some kind of
229
individualized consideration is required in the assignment context.
In answering this question, the probable effect on balkanization is
230
key.

225. Much of the evidence will remain disputed due to the various methodological
challenges. See supra notes 201, 214 and accompanying text (discussing some of the difficulties).
The point is not that conceptions of identity are necessarily indifferent to empirical truth, but
that constitutive claims will predominate when the empirics cannot provide decisive guidance.
226. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987).
227. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). The empirical debate over the various potential benefits
and harms of integrated schools echoes in some ways the debate over the Court’s use of social
science evidence in Brown. See Siegel, supra note 134, at 1480–89.
228. An alternative would be for the Court to adopt Judge Kozinski’s recommendation to
apply “robust and realistic rational basis review.” Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski,
J., concurring in the result). This seems unlikely, however, in light of all the case law holding
that racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny. For a recent pronouncement, see Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005).
229. The Court could avoid addressing the applicability of an individualized consideration
requirement by holding that the plans at issue are not narrowly tailored for some other reason.
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (flagging the other requirements). It seems
unlikely, however, that the Court would decline to discuss the issue of individualized
consideration when it was decisive in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz and the lower federal courts are
divided over it.
230. I do not analyze separately most of the other narrow tailoring factors, including
whether schools can achieve the compelling interests I have identified without using race
explicitly. It is noteworthy, however, that the distinction between the benefits of integration and
affirmance of integration may be important in considering the issue of race-neutral alternatives.
Proxy variables like geography or socioeconomic status may achieve some measure of
integration under some circumstances—because they are not in fact race neutral when the
purpose of using them is to achieve racial integration. But such proxies are less likely than the
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B. Individualized Consideration
1. Deriving the Standard. If one or more compelling interests
supports voluntary integration plans, where, if anywhere, should such
plans be situated along the balkanization continuum set forth at the
end of Part II? Should the Court view the robust and explicit use of
race as compatible with the legal requirements of individualized
consideration, or should it analogize to Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz by
requiring school districts not to overuse race, in part by rendering
such use opaque? Should the Justices deploy the individualized
consideration requirement to prohibit school boards from using race
at all, or should the Court reject all of these options and fashion a
different individualized consideration requirement for this different
setting?
The proper resolution of these questions turns not on a
mechanical application of controlling precedent. Race-conscious
assignment plans are unlike racial discrimination laws of the past,
which subordinated racial minorities. And for reasons I will explore
in detail, they are unlike laws of the present that impose burdens on
members of one race in order to benefit members of another.231
Rather, the appropriate resolution rests on either a sweeping
constitutional judgment about racial questions generally in America,
or a contextual judgment about the likely effect of voluntary
integration plans on racial balkanization in American society.
For the reasons offered in Part II, it is difficult to argue that a
global judgment about race should determine the kind of
individualized consideration requirement that is appropriate in this
setting. The Court does not render such judgments. Instead, it has
made clear in Grutter and elsewhere that “[c]ontext matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause”; that “[n]ot every decision influenced by race is
explicit use of race to advance the cause of having government expressively endorse the value of
integration. Affirming the value of integrated schools requires public recognition of the reality
of race. Colorblindness discourse wars with the American moral ideal of racial integration.
231. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result)
(“But there is something unreal about . . . efforts to apply the teachings of prior Supreme Court
cases, all decided in very different contexts, to the plan at issue here. I hear the thud of square
pegs being pounded into round holes.”); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir.
2005) (Boudin, J., concurring) (“[The plan] is not, like old-fashioned racial discrimination laws,
aimed at oppressing blacks; nor, like modern affirmative action, does it seek to give one racial
group an edge over another. . . . [T]he plan does not segregate persons by race. Nor does it
involve racial quotas.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
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equally objectionable”; and that “strict scrutiny is designed to provide
a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity
of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the
232
use of race in that particular context.”
If the kind of individualized consideration requirement
appropriate in this setting does not follow from a general judgment
about race, then the Court must render a contextual judgment about
the net expected effect of using racial criteria on racial balkanization.
This judgment, in turn, requires the Court to consider not only the
social benefits of integrated schools discussed in Part III.A, but also
the relevance of merit, the symbolic message, and the individual
burdens in this setting. As Part II demonstrated, these considerations
are at least as relevant to the tailoring inquiry as they are to the
interest analysis. This is because the narrow tailoring inquiry imposes
substantive limits that often have little to do with ensuring fit and
much to do with reducing balkanization.
It is instructive in this regard to compare the potential for
balkanization in the context of affirmative action in higher education
with the potential for balkanization in the context of race-conscious
233
student assignments. The universe of potential social threats that
232. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (“[S]trict scrutiny does take ‘relevant differences’ into account—
indeed, that is its fundamental purpose.”); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343–44 (1960)
(“[I]n dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by
an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on
and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of
context in disregard of variant controlling facts.”).
Justices Scalia and Thomas, by contrast, do tend to make global judgments about racial
questions. See, e.g., supra note 124 and accompanying text. Would they object to a policy that
took race into account in dividing students up within a public school? Imagine that a random
draw resulted in six African American children and two white children being assigned to one
first-grade class, while the other first-grade class was all white. Would it be constitutionally
problematic to reshuffle the children so that each class would consist of five white children and
three African American children, and to do this for all the reasons that Jefferson County and
Seattle take race into account? If Justices Scalia and Thomas would conceive the reshuffling as
unconstitutional, then their views would seem out of touch with how most people would likely
regard the situation because they would think the potential harm miniscule. If Justices Scalia
and Thomas would perceive no constitutional infirmity, then they do not really mean what they
say about the inherently invidious nature of racial classifications regardless of context.
233. The analysis here actually requires several comparisons: (1) between K–12 education
and higher education; (2) between achieving the compelling interests identified in Part III.A
without using race and achieving them by using race; and (3) between the effects of using race
explicitly and the effects of using race implicitly. I leave the second question to others. But see
supra note 230. I merely note that in general, there are good reasons for skepticism that school
districts can achieve similar levels of racial integration without using racial criteria to some

02__SIEGEL.DOC

836

1/11/2007 10:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:781

the Court was seeking to head off in Bakke (via Justice Powell),
Grutter, and Gratz are familiar now, but the high level of abstraction
at which these threats are frequently described conflates important
234
distinctions. I categorize the potential dangers of concern to the
Court as follows: (1) the social stigmatization of minority students as
incapable of succeeding without the intervention of government on
their behalf; (2) the associated internalization of a sense of
unworthiness by minority students; (3) the internalization of a sense
of entitlement to preferences by minority students; (4) the
stereotypical assumption that all members of a racial group think the
same way; (5) hostility generated in whites caused by their reaction to
being judged unworthy of admission potentially because of the
existence of the program; (6) hostility in whites caused by their
reaction to not getting what they want (i.e., admission) potentially
because of the existence of the program; and (7) cross-racial tension
caused by the very act of distributing benefits and burdens in part
based on race.
Viewed in light of these considerations, the school assignment
context is very different from affirmative action in university
admissions. To begin with, conventional understandings of merit are
not at stake in the assignment process; an applicant’s various abilities
are given no weight in determining placements.235 Notions of student
entitlement and desert thus have no applicability, and the concerns
they can raise do not impede the efforts of government to improve
race relations by taking race into account, whether explicitly or
implicitly. Accordingly, considerations one, two, and five pose no

extent. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation,
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 200, at 41–54. I discuss the third comparison at the end of this section.
234. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality
opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility. See University of California Regents v. Bakke,
438 U. S., at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“[P]referential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.”)). In Grutter, Justice O’Connor
reproduced the above quote from Croson in rejecting the apparent implication that racial
classifications must be “strictly reserved for remedial settings.” See 539 U.S. at 328.
235. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1181
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Students’ relative qualifications are irrelevant . . . .”), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
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236
reasonable risk of balkanization. When school officials administer
the Seattle plan, for example, assignments are certainly competitive in
the sense that race comes into play only when demand exceeds supply
at a particular school. Judge Bea made much of this fact in his
dissent.237 But this argument conceptualizes the phenomenon of
competition at too high a level of generality.238 In Seattle, as in
Jefferson County, assignments are not competitive in the evaluative
sense. Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz are thus inapt in this regard. So are
Croson and Adarand.
In addition, the assignment prospects of members of all races are
generally helped or hurt to roughly the same extent, so that the third
factor raises no concerns.239 In light of the nature of the public school
educational process, moreover, a school district’s interests do not
include securing viewpoint diversity in the classroom as part of the
“robust exchange of ideas,”240 so that the fourth concern is less
significantly implicated than in the university setting. The only
potentially strong threats to social acceptance of the use of race,
therefore, arise from the sixth and seventh considerations, although in

236. This difference between affirmative action in higher education and race-conscious
student assignments is quite significant. It makes no sense to assert that one has “earned” a
coveted assignment. Whatever one thinks of university admissions, in the assignment context no
student has earned anything. That said, some parents may feel entitled to send their children to
highly coveted local schools on the ground that they “paid their way in” to the wealthy
neighborhoods surrounding the schools.
237. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1211–12 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The District insulates
applicants belonging to certain racial groups from competition for admission to those schools
perceived to be of higher quality.”).
238. Cf. generally Tribe & Dorf, supra note 159 (analyzing levels of generality in the
definition of fundamental rights). Competition for scarce assignments may nonetheless increase
balkanization. This concern is covered by the sixth and seventh factors discussed in the text.
239. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1170 (stating that “[t]he race-based tiebreaker is
applied to both white and nonwhite students” and providing the relevant data for a particular
school year). One might respond that the Court rejected the notion of equally shared burdens
based on race in Plessy and Loving. But to so respond is to erase collective memory. There was
nothing equal about the burdens imposed by a regime of racial apartheid that mandated racial
separation in order to subordinate African Americans. One cannot plausibly suggest that the
assignment cases before the Court have anything to do with the maintenance of a caste system
or the practice of racial subordination. Johnson v. California is less off point, see supra note 108,
but it too involved racial segregation, the opposite of what voluntary integration plans aim to
produce.
240. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1182 (“[V]iewpoint diversity in the law school
and high school contexts serves different albeit overlapping ends. In the law school setting,
viewpoint diversity fosters the ‘robust exchange of ideas.’ In the high school context, viewpoint
diversity fosters racial and civic understanding.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324
(2003) (citations omitted))).
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the assignment context even these concerns seem less acute to the
extent that the burdens imposed on individual students and families
241
are not great. This is because any resulting social hostility is
distributed across members of all races when they do not receive the
assignments that they desire. Compared with affirmative action in
higher education, therefore, responsibly crafted voluntary integration
plans are more likely to send a message of integration and less likely
to increase balkanization.242 This message, to reiterate,243 is that
Americans of every race and ethnicity constitute one people who
learn and work together, not apart, and that they deserve the same
public educational opportunities without racial separation.244
The differences between affirmative action in higher education
and voluntary integration plans suggest that the sort of “[p]referment
by race” employed by such plans is very unlikely to prove “the most
divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy
245
confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.” At least
when school districts limit both the use of race and the burdens
imposed, voluntary integration plans do not run a reasonable risk of
“perpetuat[ing] the hostilities that proper consideration of race is
designed to avoid.”246 Rather, such plans likely prove “effective in
bringing about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens
247
that our constitutional tradition has always sought.”
One might object that even the limited use of race in student
assignment creates the wrong kind of politics; the message it sends

241. See infra notes 276–86 and accompanying text (analyzing the issue of individual
burdens).
242. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he FCC policy seems based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial
groups ascribe to certain ‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other citizens.
Special preferences also can foster the view that members of the favored groups are inherently
less able to compete on their own.”).
243. See supra text following note 221.
244. Of course, whether children actually receive this message depends in part on how
parents explain the school district’s use of race to their children. Those who believe that any use
of race by government sends the wrong message will probably not stress the virtues of
integration to their children. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 2, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05908; Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“The wrong
message is being sent to our children: A child’s race is more important than equal protection of
the laws, and the racial makeup of a student’s school determines his or her academic success.”).
245. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 394. “The perpetuation, of course, would be the worst of all outcomes.” Id.
247. Id. at 394–95.
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constitutes an incremental stop on the way to deeming race significant
in every aspect of American life. This assertion strives toward an
important point, but in so striving it overstates its case. Raceconscious state action can send a message that increases
balkanization, but then so can the refusal of government to act. There
is nothing necessarily wholesome about the status quo.248 Indeed, the
status quo is disturbing: America is a country many of whose public
249
schools are becoming more and more segregated each year. When
children of different races and ethnicities spend almost no time
together, the long-term effect on American society can be quite
balkanizing. The appearance and potential reality of balkanization
are evident when segregated neighborhoods produce segregated

248. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But we
are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of lawsanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools.”); Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, J., concurring) (“Some may be
offended by any express use of race as a touchstone for transfers, believing that a race-based
criterion is the wrong lesson for school boards to teach and students to absorb. But ours is a
society with a heritage of racial problems growing out of generations of slavery and post-slavery
segregation, and it may be unrealistic to suppose that everything will work out well if only race
is ignored in every context.”). Justice Ginsburg added this useful reminder in Gratz:
In the wake of a system of racial caste only recently ended, large disparities endure.
Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary disproportionately by race.
Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided. African-American and Hispanic
children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming
institutions. Adult African-Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than whites
with equivalent levels of education. Equally credentialed job applicants receive
different receptions depending on their race. Irrational prejudice is still encountered
in real estate markets and consumer transactions. Bias both conscious and
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever
genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.
539 U.S. at 299–301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes, citations, and quotation marks
omitted); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345–46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
249. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, School Colors, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 24, 2006, at 15
(documenting that the percentage of black students attending schools with a majority nonwhite
population has increased in every region of the country over the past fifteen years or so);
CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 196 (“Racial segregation remains an ever-present fact,
demarcating neighborhoods, urban jurisdictions, and thus many public schools. Middle schools
and high schools that are desegregated often include classrooms and school activities that reveal
obvious racial disparities.”). But see Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local
Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1
(Summer 2006) (examining the largest 100 school districts in the South and Border regions and
finding that segregation measured as imbalance generally has not increased in the previous
decade, excepting Charlotte and Winston Salem, North Carolina).
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250
Properly formulated, therefore, the concern about
schools.
expressive harm counsels caution, not abandonment.
Relatedly, a proponent of colorblindness might insist that the
imposition of burdens based on race is inevitably balkanizing because
those who must bear the burdens resent the fact that they would not
have to endure them but for the color of their skin. Like the objection
that stresses the expressive harm of using racial criteria, this is hardly
an insubstantial concern, and it advises prudence and restraint. But
this concern is shortsighted in its focus on some immediate
resentment to the exclusion of long-term social benefits, and it proves
too much because desegregation is all the more balkanizing in this
way when courts impose race-conscious remedies for de jure
segregation. Voluntary integration plans would not exist for any
significant period of time if they did not enjoy broad community
support, and reasonable concerns that government not increase
balkanization can be addressed by constitutional and prudential
attention to how the plans use race. Prohibiting any consideration of
race as balkanizing would be overkill that itself would likely increase
balkanization on balance because, to reiterate, the status quo is
characterized by rampant racial segregation.
This discussion suggests that the prospect of greater
balkanization poses much less of a concern in the context of voluntary
integration plans than in the context of affirmative action in higher
education. By using racial criteria intelligently in the assignment
process in order to integrate their schools, districts can reduce
balkanization in American society.

250. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) (“The
record shows, and common experience tells us, that students tend to select the schools closest to
their homes, which means that schools will reflect the composition of the neighborhood where
they are located. Neighborhoods, however, do not reflect the racial composition of the city as a
whole. In Seattle, ‘as in many other cities, minorities and whites often live in different
neighborhoods.’ Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). To the extent that students
gravitate to the schools near their homes, the schools will have the same racial composition as
the neighborhood. This means that student patterns of interacting primarily with members of
their own race that are first developed by living in racially isolated neighborhoods will be
continued and exacerbated by the school experience.”); see also Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Lynn’s aim is to preserve local schools as an option without having
the housing pattern of de facto segregation projected into the school system.”); Ryan, supra note
5, at 327 (“Until residential integration increases dramatically, most public schools will remain
racially isolated unless school boards adopt conscious measures to achieve integration. It is that
simple.” (footnote omitted)).
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Historical experience, including past judicial practice,
substantiates this comparative analysis of racial balkanization. In the
decades after Brown, the Court and individual Justices repeatedly
declared, albeit in dicta, that the Constitution permits voluntary
efforts to integrate local public schools well beyond what the
Constitution requires. I refer not only to Brown itself,251 but also to
252
decisions like Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
253
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, Keyes v. School
District No. 1,254 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.255 The
Court in these cases was validating the then-uncontroversial

251. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of law.”) (emphasis added). See BICKEL, supra note 187, at 119–20 (discussing the
implications of the Court’s choice of language).
252. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order
to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities . . . .”). Chief
Justice Burger authored these words.
253. 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (“[A]s a matter of educational policy school authorities may well
conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any
constitutional requirements.”).
254. 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“School
boards would, of course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to promote school
desegregation . . . . Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding
minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated school experience.”).
In Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U.S. 1380 (1978), Justice Rehnquist, acting as a
Circuit Justice, rejected the argument of a stay applicant that “‘California in an attempt to
racially balance schools [may not] use its doctrine of independent state grounds to ignore the
federal rights of its citizens to be free from racial quotas and to be free from extensive pupil
transportation that destroys fundamental rights of liberty and privacy,’” id. at 1382 (quoting stay
application). Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning is directly on point:
But this is not the traditional argument of a local school board contending that it has
been required by court order to implement a pupil assignment plan which was not
justified by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
argument is indeed novel . . . . While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme
Court of California was required by the United States Constitution to take the action
that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that
Constitution to take such action.
Id. at 1382–83. Coming from one of the most conservative jurists on the Court, this language
should give pause to those who would obliterate the “play in the joints” between what the Equal
Protection Clause requires and what it prohibits. See supra note 147 (discussing this point and
analogizing to the Court’s religion jurisprudence).
255. 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (“Attending an ethnically diverse school . . . prepar[es]
minority children for citizenship in our pluralistic society, while, we may hope, teaching
members of the racial majority to live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority
heritage.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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conclusions of many federal courts that the Constitution permits local
efforts to integrate a community’s public schools when the
256
Constitution does not require such action. The collective lesson of
many school desegregation decisions is that voluntary integration
plans do not raise grave constitutional concerns.
Subsequent decisions limiting the remedies that federal courts
257
may impose in school desegregation cases or requiring that federal
258
desegregation remedies end are entirely consistent with this reading
of the historical record. The Court in these cases gave voice to local
259
resistance and limited the extent to which the federal courts could
impose integration on communities. The Court stated that it was
doing so in order to preserve “local control over the operation of
schools.”260 When local communities themselves opted to integrate
their public schools, the federal courts perceived no constitutional
impediment.
Significantly, when the composition of the federal judiciary and
the ambient political climate changed in the 1970s and “courts began
to reshape the presumption against racial classification into a
constitutional constraint on voluntary efforts to combat
261
segregation,” this reshaping was directed not at race-conscious
student assignment plans, but at the significantly more divisive issue
of affirmative action in higher education.262 Reva Siegel has
convincingly shown that “the legal system was beginning to treat
differently what was at stake in two potentially similar cases,” and

256. See Siegel, supra note 134, at 1511–12 (noting the “federalism question” informing “the
view that would prevail throughout the 1960s: a state or local government might adopt raceconscious districting plans to alleviate de facto segregation, when courts had not construed the
Constitution to require them”); id. at 1517 (documenting that “[d]uring the 1960s, courts
routinely upheld the right of state and local governments to act in a race-conscious fashion to
ameliorate de facto segregation in public school assignments”); id. at 1518 (“[T]here was hardly
a pressing sense that the Fourteenth Amendment was a constraint on voluntary efforts to
desegregate.”).
257. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting interdistrict remedies in
the absence of interdistrict violations and effects).
258. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
259. See supra note 134.
260. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–42.
261. Siegel, supra note 134, at 1521.
262. Id. at 1526 (“In the 1960s and early 1970s, courts had not imposed significant
constitutional limits on race-conscious action undertaken to ameliorate segregation in public
schools and in the construction industry, but they began to respond differently when plaintiffs
challenged new race-conscious measures designed to help integrate the nation’s universities.”).
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that “[m]ajority-group objections to race-conscious professional
school admissions policies played an important role in the policies’
emergent characterization as racial classifications subject to the
263
The historical record,
presumption of unconstitutionality.”
therefore, confirms that voluntary integration plans have been less
balkanizing than affirmative action in university admissions.264
If it is correct as a matter of both analysis and history that raceconscious assignment plans are less potentially balkanizing than
affirmative action in higher education, it follows that the Court need
not be as concerned with public perceptions in this context as it was in
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz. This implication is significant because
creating an appearance of minimal color consciousness poses special
challenges in this setting for two reasons. First, the balkanizing
potential of explicit racial criteria cannot be diminished by equating
race to place of residence, student choice, sibling preference, etc., in
the same way that race can be equated to various talents (e.g.,
intellectual, musical, or athletic) or other dimensions of general
diversity (e.g., geography).265 Residence, student choice, and siblings
have little to do with racial diversity, but various talents and
geography arguably have something to do with general diversity.
Second, in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz it was impossible to know
for sure whether race was decisive in particular cases. With voluntary
integration plans, by contrast, one can often know with certainty.266 In
263. Id. at 1528–29. See id. at 1529 n.204 (noting the public “perception that race-conscious
desegregation initiatives in post-secondary education were constitutionally problematic in ways
that such initiatives in elementary and secondary education were not”).
264. Cf., e.g., Brief for the Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 8–9, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 2006) (“While the great majority of Louisvillians opposed desegregation in 1975, the
vast majority of parents polled in 2000—77%—supported the use of race in student assignment,
and 82% of parents believed that students benefited from a racially diverse school
environment.”); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854 n.41 (W.D.
Ky. 2004) (“In 2000, a confidential survey of high school juniors was conducted for JCPS to
record the benefits of a racially integrated school system. Over 90% of the students who
received the survey responded. Approximately 92% of White students and 96% of Black
students reported that they were ‘very comfortable’ or ‘comfortable’ working with students
from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Over 80% of Black and White students who
responded said their school experience helped them learn how to relate to students from other
racial groups.”).
265. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that Justice Powell’s distinction
between a quota and a “plus” factor enabled him to equate race with other characteristics that
are less emotionally freighted).
266. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (Selya, J.,
dissenting) (“In one sense, then, this plan is even more harmful than the racially inflexible
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other words, it may not be easy to reconcile the publicly apparent use
of race in student assignment in order to advance racial diversity with
the appearance of not treating individuals in part as members of
racial groups. In the Kentucky case, the district court put great weight
on its determination that for the most part “the Board has
undertaken considerable effort to achieve its goals without the overt
267
use of race in student assignments,” and that “the racial guidelines
play a muted role in the assignment process along with other
factors.”268 But the court did not seem to register that such statements
are in tension with its ability to determine that the JCPS denied
“Plaintiff Crystal Meredith’s son, Joshua McDonald, . . . his transfer
from Young to Bloom under the racial guidelines.”269
The primary way that school districts can render the use of race
less overt in the assignment process is in the drawing of attendance
zones to increase integration. In Jefferson County, for example, the
school district ensures compliance with the racial guidelines primarily
by drawing attendance zones with race in mind.270 This is probably
why Chief Judge Heyburn wrote that the district avoided “the overt
271
use of race” and that “the racial guidelines play a muted role.” The
school district may have concluded, similar to the implicit rationale of
Justice Powell in Bakke and the Court in Grutter and Gratz, that
implicit uses of race are less divisive—because less apparent and less
seemingly “personal”—than granting or denying assignment or
transfer requests explicitly based on the requesting student’s race.
To reiterate, however, it is less important to submerge the use of
race in this setting than in the context of affirmative action in higher
education because the risk of increasing balkanization is significantly

program struck down in Gratz. There, prospective non-minority students could be admitted by
the terms of the policy itself and thus those who were rejected could look to something other
than race as a reason for their failure.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). Toward the end of
this section, I suggest a way to address this issue if it is deemed constitutionally problematic.
267. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 862 (emphasis added). The court contrasted sharply such use of race with the
racial classifications deployed in the one part of the plan that it held unconstitutional: “The
significance of separating traditional school applicants into explicit racial categories is that
students are placed on separate assignment tracks where race becomes ‘the defining feature of
his or her application.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337
(2003)).
269. Id. at 860 n.48.
270. See id. at 843 (“The geographic boundaries of resides areas and cluster schools
determine most school assignments.”).
271. Id. at 861, 862 (emphasis added).
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lower as a general matter. There are two principal ways that raceconscious assignment plans could increase balkanization. First, they
could subordinate all other traditional assignment factors to race in
granting or denying student requests for assignment or transfer,
thereby sending the balkanizing message that the racial divide in the
community is so severe “that race matters most”272 in public
education. Second, they could impose severe burdens on individual
students and families because of the use of race, whether in disposing
of individual requests or in drawing attendance zones. Individualized
273
consideration must therefore attend to these concerns.
Accordingly, the Court should impose a modest individualized
consideration requirement in the context of race-conscious
assignment plans, one less demanding than the requirement
articulated in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, but more demanding than
274
the requirement employed in remedial or functional settings. Under
this approach, school districts would not need to avoid making any
assignments in which race was obviously decisive. The critical inquiry,
rather, would be how much of an impact district-wide the use of racial
classifications has in disposing of individual requests, and how much
of a burden the use of racial criteria imposes on students and families.
Stated more precisely, the individualized consideration
requirement that I recommend would allow school districts to use
race in assigning students to public schools so long as: (1) the school
district’s use of racial criteria in making assignments constitutes only

272. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005).
273. One might object that the individualized consideration requirement and the undue
burden analysis are separate components of narrow tailoring. In Grutter, however, the Court’s
undue burden inquiry was parasitic on its application of the individualized consideration
requirement. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. If concerns about the imposition of
undue burdens are satisfied because a program affords individualized consideration, it must be
because the individualized consideration inquiry appropriately incorporates an undue burden
analysis as part of its requirements. A concern with racial balkanization animates each
component of narrow tailoring. See supra notes 66, 128; infra note 294.
274. Some defenders of voluntary integration plans would prefer to argue that the concept
of individualized consideration is inapplicable in assessing the plans. While this approach is
tempting, it is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of individualized consideration. As
developed in Part I, individualized consideration requires a determination of whether an
individual satisfies the selection criteria that are deemed relevant to the government decision.
School districts thus afford individualized consideration in deciding which students should
attend which schools. The controversial normative question is what role, if any, race can play in
student assignment. Contrary to the assumption of the opponents of these plans, the concept of
individualized consideration cannot provide the answer. The question, in other words, is the
extent to which race may be part of individualized consideration.
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one of several factors; (2) the district’s use of racial classifications in
granting or denying individual assignment or transfer requests, as a
statistical matter, does not predominate over its use of other factors
275
across the district as a whole; and (3) the use of racial criteria in
disposing of individual requests and in drawing attendance zones (if
applicable) does not impose substantial burdens on individual
276
students and families.
The first factor provides one way of ensuring that school districts
do not overuse racial criteria. No specific criteria should be required;
that is for the districts themselves to decide. But if a district elects to
consider race in pursuit of racial integration, then individualized
consideration requires the district also to employ other relevant
criteria. These include, for example, student preferences for certain
schools, student residence, student interests, school capacity, presence
of siblings in a school, where the student attended school the previous
year, family hardship, ease of parental involvement, socioeconomic
status, and lottery.
Under the second factor, race may be decisive in individual cases
in which the school district grants or denies student requests for
particular schools, just as it is decisive in particular cases in Bakke- or
Grutter-type admissions programs. But race may not be decisive too
much of the time. As with most line-drawing problems in
constitutional law, it may be impossible to specify in advance how
much is too much. The answer in particular cases would depend on
how segregated the school district is, and on how necessary it is to use
racial classifications to a particular extent in order to achieve a
significant measure of integration.277 Race should not be dispositive
275. Although in redistricting a finding of predominance triggers strict scrutiny, here strict
scrutiny would be triggered by government’s use of a racial classification. A finding of
predominance in this setting would be dispositive of the constitutional inquiry. Here, moreover,
the defendant school board would have the burden of proving non-predominance in order to
survive the narrow tailoring inquiry.
276. Each factor is derived from the Court’s past decisions discussed in Part II. They reflect
the view (to which no court has ascribed) that the redistricting cases are relevant. But they also
reflect the view that the redistricting cases are not exactly on point. As discussed in the text,
race-conscious redistricting separates voters based on race. Moreover, the burdens are
potentially higher in the assignment context because there is no redistricting analogue to a long
bus commute or an inferior education.
277. A potential paradox lurks here because the perceived need for integration is likely
correlated with the individual burdens imposed by a race-conscious plan. The more segregated a
school district is, the greater will be the felt need for governmental action to achieve integration,
but the greater may also be the burdens imposed by a plan—for example, bus commutes may be
longer. The individualized consideration requirement may thus limit the use of race to the
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278
regarding “a significant number” of assignment or transfer requests,
and this surely means far fewer than half of them.
In narrowing the permissible range further, the relevant tradeoff
entails allowing districts to secure and to affirm meaningful levels of
racial integration while avoiding the expressive harms and significant
burdens that racial classifications can impose. The Court should
probably draw a rough line in order to provide guidance to school
boards. As a general matter, no constitutional problem would seem to
be presented when race proved decisive in granting or denying up to
fifteen or twenty percent of individual assignments or transfer
requests. When race was decisive more than roughly one-fifth of the
time, the plan should probably be regarded as suspect.
While it is difficult to avoid claims of arbitrariness in proposing a
rough limit of fifteen or twenty percent (or any other limit), the only
reasonable way to resolve a line-drawing problem is to draw a
reasonable line. The Court has sought to do just that on several
279
occasions. A constraint of fifteen or twenty percent would likely
allow many school districts to achieve significant levels of integration
in the face of segregated housing patterns while avoiding the symbolic
and material harms of robust race consciousness. As discussed in the
next section, for example, both plans before the Court have stayed
within a fifteen percent upper bound in disposing of student requests,
and both have achieved meaningful levels of integration.
The details of specific plans would also matter in light of the
third factor, which focuses on the burdens imposed on students and
families when government uses racial criteria in the assignment
process, whether in disposing of individual requests or in drawing
attendance zones (if the plan so requires). Whether a given plan met
this component of the individualized consideration requirement
would be determined by an evaluation of several factors. These
280
include quality differences among the schools in the district; the

greatest extent when residential segregation is most severe. A way to ameliorate this problem
would be to allow the scope of the permissible use of race to vary somewhat with the scope of
the segregation at which the use of race is directed.
278. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
279. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (ratio limits
on punitive damages); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (time limit on detaining
aliens pending removal); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991) (time
limit on delay between arrest and probable cause hearing).
280. The burdens can be particularly high when a school district allocates scarce slots in a
highly sought-after magnet school, whether operated by lottery or otherwise.
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amount of student time spent on a school bus each day as a result of
the use of race; the impact of using race on parental convenience and
involvement; and the availability of hardship exceptions or appeals.
For example, the Swann Court’s holding regarding the use of bus
transportation as a “tool of desegregation” is apt here: bus
transportation is constitutionally permissible unless “the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children
or significantly impinge on the educational process.”281 The
constitutional concern is not whether a plan as a whole imposes
burdens greater than the benefits it provides; rather, the burden
factors are probative of whether the plan is sufficiently sensitive to
the circumstances of each student and family. In other words, an
assessment of individual burdens must be part of the selection criteria
when government makes race a relevant criterion in student
assignment.
If my proposal were deemed to impose insufficient limits on the
use of explicit racial criteria in student assignment, whether in
appearance or reality, an alternative would be to soften the use of
racial classifications by making race more of a Bakke- or Grutter-type
“plus” factor. Under this individualized consideration requirement,
the granting of an assignment or transfer request would never turn
explicitly and exclusively on race, but would depend instead on an
implicit and opaque evaluation of several factors, such as commute
distance, family hardship, and the relation between program offerings
and student interests. Race could still be a factor, but it would never
be obviously decisive when the district denied a student request.
Because of the differences between voluntary integration plans and
affirmative action in higher education in terms of their relative
potential for balkanization, I do not endorse this kind of
individualized consideration requirement. But such a requirement
would be more responsive to the conflicting constitutional values at
stake than a requirement that prohibited any explicit use of race as an
assignment criterion.
While the burden inquiry I propose extends to the use of race
both in granting or denying individual requests and in drawing
attendance zones, I have limited the predominance inquiry to the
former aspect of voluntary integration plans. Unlike race-conscious
redistricting, therefore, I have not recommended a requirement of

281.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971).
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nonpredominance in drawing attendance zones. This is because the
redistricting cases are inapt in a significant respect: while raceconscious redistricting separates racial groups in order to give
282
members of one group a more effective vote, race-conscious
attendance zones of the sort before the Court in the Jefferson County
case integrate racial groups in order to benefit students of every race
283
and ethnicity. The expressive message and the potential for
balkanization, therefore, are quite different. As long as school boards
do not impose significant burdens on individuals and families by using
race in drawing attendance zones—for example, by drawing zones
with non-contiguous boundaries that require long bus commutes—the
zoning should survive judicial scrutiny. Under my approach,
therefore, courts would not have to comb the legislative record and
the enactment history for evidence of the predominant use of race in
drawing attendance zones.
Because I would impose a predominance inquiry at the microlevel of individual requests but not at the macro-level of attendance
zones, the necessary implication is that a given degree of race
consciousness should be regarded as more suspect when deployed at
the micro-level than when used at the macro-level. It may seem
perplexing why this should be so. The answer lies in the concern
animating Justice Powell’s distinction between using racial quotas and
using race as a “plus” factor, and the Rehnquist Court’s distinction
between a publicly declared award of twenty points and a publicly
undefined “plus” factor.284 Judging from the Court’s previous
interventions, the felt impact of race-consciousness on those who are
burdened by it is less acute when it is less publicly apparent. In other
words, the individualized consideration requirement that I endorse
would apply the lesson of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz to a different
setting: racial criteria are less likely to be balkanizing when
government does not needlessly impress on people that they (or their
children) are being treated in part as members of racial groups. In the
assignment context, moreover, the use of race is more general and

282. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(“It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”); supra note 97 and accompanying text
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
283. If school districts drew attendance zones that separated the races in order to give
minorities more control over the public schools that their children attended, the analogy to
redistricting would be stronger. See supra note 198 (referencing a recent Nebraska law).
284. See supra Parts II.A–B (discussing Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz).
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diffuse—that is, less seemingly “personal”—in drawing attendance
zones than in disposing of individual requests for certain schools.
Accordingly, a given degree of race-consciousness is less
constitutionally problematic in drawing attendance zones for large
numbers of students than in granting or rejecting individual
assignment or transfer requests. Even if in certain situations the two
285
uses of race would achieve the same “net operative results,” the
perception and thus the potential for balkanization can be quite
different. Race must not predominate in disposing of individual
requests, but no such requirement should limit the drawing of
attendance zones. Rather, a burden analysis should constrain the use
286
of racial criteria in drawing attendance zones.
In evaluating colorblindness discourse in this setting, it is
important to bear in mind that a genuine commitment to
colorblindness would prohibit any race consciousness even in drawing
attendance zones, siting schools to increase integration, establishing
magnet schools to prevent white flight, etc. Districts could be hardpressed to achieve even modest levels of integration.287 The Justices
presumably know this and care. If the Court invalidates the Jefferson
County and Seattle plans, therefore, it is more likely to prohibit
explicit racial classifications that impose obvious individual burdens
(e.g., a race-based denial of an assignment request) than it is to
prohibit implicit race consciousness that imposes non-obvious
individual burdens (e.g., race-conscious attendance zones)—even
when the former use of race is more limited than the latter. Justices
Powell and O’Connor are gone, but appearances may matter to
several current Justices.
Although my analysis accepts (as it must) the constitutional
relevance of social appearances, I do not advise prohibiting any use of
racial classifications in student assignment. First, the Court has
allowed them in the more divisive area of affirmative action in higher
education. It would therefore make scant sense to impose a flat
prohibition here. Second, banning even the modest use of racial
classifications in student assignment would ignore the significant
benefits that they can produce, both in achieving greater levels of

285. See supra notes 37–38 (quoting Mishkin’s analysis of Bakke).
286. For a contrary view of the appropriate scope of the predominance inquiry in the
context of voluntary integration plans, see generally Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with the author).
287. See supra note 233.
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integration and in expressively affirming the value of integration.
As Part II demonstrated, the Court’s opinions display sensitivity not
just to the costs, but also to the benefits of using racial classifications
to a limited extent.
Finally, a complete ban on using racial classifications might make
everyone within a school district worse off by forcing school boards to
decide between pursuing integration and enhancing student choice.
Districts that focused on integration would leave all students with
fewer options. For example, high school students in Seattle enjoy
more choices than do students in Jefferson County, and the Seattle
plan uses race more explicitly than does the JCPS plan, precisely
because the Seattle School District does not use the attendance zones
that the JCPS employs. The JCPS, moreover, is able to allow some
measure of student choice because it too makes limited use of racial
classifications. Without using racial classifications to some extent in
order to prevent student choices from unraveling the integration
produced by the attendance zones, the JCPS might have to either
strictly limit student choices or abandon integration as a goal. The
Constitution should not impose on communities an acute trade-off
between racial integration and student choice.
2. Applying the Standard. With these considerations in mind, I
turn now to the plans before the Court.289 Although the district court
in the case involving Jefferson County, Kentucky, fixated
inappropriately on the requirement of individualized consideration
articulated in Grutter and Gratz, the court nonetheless tracked much
of my recommended approach. It stated that “the Court must
determine whether the 2001 Plan incorporates some sufficient form of
individualized attention in the assignment process,” and “conclude[d]
that it does.”290 This was because “the JCPS assignment process
focuses a great deal of attention on the individual characteristics of a
student’s application, such as place of residence and student choice of
school or program. It is individualized consideration of a different

288. See supra note 224.
289. Because I have not comprehensively reviewed the lower court records, the following
evaluations should be deemed incomplete. If the Court were to adopt an approach similar to
mine, a remand would probably be warranted in order to enable the lower courts to apply the
standard in the first instance.
290. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 858 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
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kind in a different context than the Supreme Court found in
291
Grutter.” The court then identified similarities to Grutter:
In significant ways, the 2001 Plan actually operates like the “plus”
system of which the Supreme Court has spoken so approvingly.
Many factors determine student assignment, including address,
student choice, lottery placement, and, at the margins, the racial
guidelines. But, race is simply one possible factor among many,
acting only occasionally as a permissible “tipping” factor in most of
292
the JCPS assignment process.

Putting aside the propriety of the court’s distinguishing and then
analogizing almost exclusively to Grutter, the important point is that
the school district’s use of racial classifications in granting or denying
assignment or transfer requests is modest in scope, as are the racebased burdens imposed by the assignment process as a whole. Race
affects the district’s disposition of some student requests, but not
many, and other factors such as student preferences and school
capacity weigh more heavily in the process. The court specifically
pointed to “[d]ata showing that the majority of students attend their
resides schools and that only a very small percentage of students are
not assigned to one of the schools they preferred,” which “suggest[ed]
the minimal impact of race on this process.”293
In addition, the court found that all JCPS schools are “equal and
integrated” and “have similar funding, offer similar academic
programs and comprise more similar ranges of students than possible
294
in neighborhood schools.” As far as I can tell, moreover, the use of
race does not require onerous bus commutes. These considerations
more than suffice to satisfy the individualized consideration
requirement appropriate in this setting.295

291. Id. at 859.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 861–62. Earlier in its opinion, the court specifically noted that “[g]enerally, about
95–96% of all elementary students receive their first or second choice cluster school,” id. at 845
n.18, and that “most” middle school and high school students “choose to attend their resides
school, for which the only selection criteria are [elementary or] middle school graduation and
place of residence,” id. at 845.
294. Id. at 860, 862. The court recorded these observations as part of its “undue harm”
analysis, but the different dimensions of the narrow tailoring inquiry can bleed together in light
of the concern with racial balkanization that unites them. See supra note 273 (discussing the
Grutter Court’s treatment of the narrow tailoring inquiry); supra notes 66, 128.
295. The United States misunderstands the concept of individualized consideration and
misapplies Grutter when it chides the JCPS for not “minimizing the use of race in its assignment
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To be sure, the district uses race much more in drawing
attendance zones than in disposing of individual assignment or
transfer requests. Some of these zones have non-contiguous
296
boundaries that are designed to increase integration. In this regard,
the district court’s reference to “the minimal impact of race on this
process”297 was not accurate. But for the reasons already discussed,
race consciousness in drawing attendance zones is constitutionally
unproblematic in the absence of significant burdens on students and
families.
The Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion than the
McFarland district court regarding the applicability of individualized
consideration in this setting. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “if a
noncompetitive, voluntary student assignment plan is otherwise
narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in an
individualized, holistic manner.”298 It so held because “the dangers
that are present in the university context—of substituting racial
preference for qualification-based competition—are absent here.”299
The court of appeals made an important point. As discussed,
however, higher education is not the only context in which the Court
has imposed an individualized consideration requirement, and the
relevance of individual merit is not the only determinant of whether
the Justices have demanded some form of individualized
consideration. I therefore assess the compatibility of the Seattle plan
with the form of individualized consideration that is most appropriate
in light of the Court’s decisions.

plan and maximizing the concept of individualized consideration.” Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at 16–17. For the reasons stated in Part I,
there is nothing about the use of racial criteria that is incompatible with the concept of
individualized consideration. And for the reasons discussed in Part II, the federal government’s
rendition has little to do with the use of race approved by Justice Powell in Bakke and by the
Court in Grutter.
296. Brief for Respondents at 8, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915
(U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“Racial integration in resides middle schools and high schools . . . is
accomplished primarily through the drawing of attendance areas, some of which have noncontiguous boundaries. In elementary schools, it is accomplished by the cluster plan . . . .”).
297. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861–62.
298. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1183 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
299. Id. at 1181.
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The Seattle plan is on par with the JCPS plan in some ways, but
300
it is more suspect in other ways. Like the JCPS, the district uses race
with care and the resulting impact on the disposition of individual
assignment requests is modest. Specifically, before the plan was
modified to decrease the impact of race,301 around 300 (or 10 percent)
of the roughly 3,000 incoming high school students were assigned to
302
an oversubscribed high school because of the race-based tiebreaker.

300. Neither plan makes distinctions among minority groups, but this fact is potentially
more problematic from the standpoint of narrow tailoring in the case of the Seattle plan. While
Seattle is a racially and ethnically diverse community, id. at 1166, the JCPS is populated almost
entirely by black and white students, McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.6. Judge Bea decried
that the Seattle School District “does not even consider the student’s actual race.” Parents
Involved, 426 F.3d at 1210 (Bea, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit determined that “the
District’s choice to increase diversity along the white/nonwhite axis is rooted in Seattle’s history
and current reality of de facto segregation resulting from Seattle’s segregated housing patterns,”
and that “[t]his white/nonwhite focus is also consistent with the history of public school
desegregation measures throughout the country.” Id. at 1187. Although Judge Bea’s concern is
hardly trivial in light of the expressive dimension of racial classifications, the fact remains that
white/nonwhite segregation is the most significant dimension of racial segregation in Seattle.
Moreover, attending to levels of diversity among minority groups would require greater use of
race than Seattle attempted and would therefore impose more substantial burdens. It would be
counterproductive for narrow tailoring to require this. Accord Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
418 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
More troubling in some respects are arguments that the district has done little to
ameliorate racial isolation in its most segregated schools. See Petitioner’s Brief at 37, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (criticizing
the District’s use of race for its “underinclusiveness”). It is unclear why the district purports to
be concerned with reducing racial isolation and yet has done nothing to address such isolation in
its most segregated, less popular high schools. See id. at 37 (reporting that Rainier Beach High
School is 8 percent white and Cleveland High School is 10 percent white). From the standpoint
of ensuring a proper fit between means and ends, these facts raise questions about the
genuineness of the district’s stated interest in reducing isolation. But from the perspective of
reducing balkanization potentially caused by racial classifications, the district’s approach is
defensible. If the alleged constitutional problem is any use of race, the less suspect course
cannot be more use of race. See id. at 19 (“At a minimum, the District could have . . . narrow[ed]
the use of race by broadening to 20 percent the band of permissible deviation from ‘balance.’”).
Moreover, it cannot be the case that the Constitution prohibits the district from addressing any
problems of racial isolation unless it addresses all or even most problems of racial isolation.
301. The Ninth Circuit explained that initially “schools that deviated by more than 10
percent” from the racial make up of Seattle public schools as a whole “were deemed racially
imbalanced. For the 2001–2002 school year, however, the triggering number was increased to 15
percent, softening the effect of the tiebreaker.” Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1170 (footnote
omitted). Moreover, “the District also developed a ‘thermostat,’ whereby the tiebreaker is
applied to the entering ninth grade student population only until it comes within the 15 percent
plus or minus variance.” Id. Finally, “[t]he tiebreaker does not apply, and race is not considered,
for students entering a high school after the ninth grade (e.g., by transfer).” Id.
302. Id.
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On the other hand, although the Ninth Circuit noted that “the
District implemented the Plan as part of a comprehensive effort to
improve and equalize the attractiveness of all the high schools,” it
303
also observed that “the high schools vary widely in desirability.”
The burdens imposed on individual students by the use of racial
criteria are significant when race determines placement in a school
304
that offers a far inferior education. It may also be troubling that, as
Judge Bea stressed, the operation of the race-based tiebreaker
confronted the children of two plaintiffs with the prospect of “a daily
multi-bus round-trip commute of over four hours.”305
Yet the en banc majority observed that all students could choose
to attend a school close to where they live: “Because there are
multiple schools in the north and south of Seattle, students for whom
proximity is a priority may elect as their first choice one of the schools
in their residential area that is not oversubscribed and be guaranteed
306
an assignment to that school.” From the standpoint of individual
burdens, however, the plan remains problematic to the extent that
students can access quality schools only if they endure long
commutes.307
303. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1169. The court of appeals continued:
Three of the northern schools—Ballard, Nathan Hale and Roosevelt—and two of the
southern schools—Garfield and Franklin—are highly desirable and oversubscribed,
meaning that more students wish to attend those schools than capacity allows. The
magnitude of the oversubscription is noteworthy: For the academic year 2000–01,
approximately 82 percent of students selected one of the oversubscribed schools as
their first choice, while only about 18 percent picked one of the undersubscribed high
schools as their first choice. Only when oversubscription occurs does the District
become involved in the assignment process.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 300, at 4 (documenting quality
differences among the high schools of the Seattle School District).
304. Cf. Comfort, 418 F.3d at 20 (“Every child in Lynn is guaranteed a seat in a district
where, as the parties have stipulated, every school provides a comparable education.”).
305. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1216 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea reported that “[t]he
parents instead enrolled their children in private schools.” Id.; see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra
note 300, at 7–9 (discussing the cases of these two families). The fact that both Judge Bea and
the petitioners elected to focus on the same two families may suggest that their stories are
extraordinary. This is an important question, and the answer is presumably ascertainable.
306. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1181 n.21.
307. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-908) (“Due to the
extraordinarily high demand for assignment to Ballard High School . . . , there was considerable
unhappiness about the effect of the integration tiebreaker in the adjacent (predominantly
white) . . . areas of Seattle. . . . It was uncontested, however, that families from these
neighborhoods could have elected to send their children to Franklin High School, which PICS
admits and the record demonstrates is a ‘very impressive’ school, or they could have sought
assignment to Garfield High School, regarded by many as Seattle’s most prestigious high school,
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In other respects, Judge Bea’s treatment of the individualized
consideration inquiry is misguided:
Here, the racial tiebreaker works to admit or exclude high school
students from certain oversubscribed schools solely on the basis of
their skin color. No other consideration affects the operation of the
racial tiebreaker; when it operates, it operates to admit or exclude
either a white or nonwhite student, depending upon how the
admission will affect the preferred balance at the oversubscribed
school. Such a program is precisely what Grutter warned against, and
what Gratz held unconstitutional: a mechanical, predetermined
policy “of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[] single
308
‘soft’ variable,” that being the student’s skin color.

Judge Bea not only ignored the differences between the university
context and the public school setting, but he also focused on the
operation of the racial tiebreaker in isolation from the rest of the
plan.309 The sibling tiebreaker accounts for 15 to 20 percent of
assignments to the ninth grade class, and the distance of a chosen
school from a student’s home accounts for 70 to 75 percent of
assignments to the ninth grade.310 The racial tiebreaker is thus one
modest factor in the assignment process. To be sure, it is decisive in
some individual cases, but the same was of course true of the
admissions process at issue in Grutter and the type of program that
Justice Powell approved in Bakke. Potential decisiveness is
necessarily entailed whenever race operates as one factor.
Judge Bea also concluded that voluntary integration plans must
consider individual talents and other contributions to general
diversity:

which was integration neutral at the time.” (citations omitted)). Although the two students
discussed in the text live north of downtown, Franklin and Garfield are located south of
downtown. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 300, at 4–5.
308. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1210 (Bea, J., dissenting).
309. The United States offers the same misguided analysis. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at 19 (“Far from ensuring individualized
consideration ‘through the entire process,’ the District’s racial tiebreaker simply labels
applicants based on race alone, and makes assignment decisions to oversubscribed schools
based solely on those labels. Students are thus automatically accepted or rejected based on their
race.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003))). By the time race comes into
play, student choices, school capacity, and sibling preferences have already influenced the
process. If race does not come into play, geography and lotteries determine the rest of the
assignments. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1169–71.
310. Id. at 1169, 1171.
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The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires the
District to focus upon the individual’s whole make up, rather than
just a group’s skin color; this protects each student’s right to equal
protection under the law. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 . . . .
....
. . . [T]hirteen- or fourteen-year-old students are not so young
that they have not yet developed unique traits to set themselves
apart from other students and add greater diversity to the student
body. The student’s race is a factor in assessing the student as an
individual, but the student may also speak English as a second
language, come from a different socioeconomic stratum than other
students, have overcome adversity, be a talented baseball player,
311
musician, or have participated in community service.

Judge Bea failed to register that the Grutter-type individualized
consideration requirement that he would impose has nothing to do
with the district’s compelling interest in racial integration (as opposed
to general diversity), whose existence he assumes “[f]or argument’s
312
sake” in this portion of his dissent. The Constitution cannot require
a school district to replace a nonevaluative student assignment plan
that seeks racial integration with an admissions process that pursues
general diversity before school officials lawfully may use race. The
point of narrow tailoring is not to alter fundamentally the nature of
the compelling interest that government seeks to advance. Thus,
Judge Bea’s purported analysis of individualized consideration
actually constitutes little more than a reiteration of his conclusion that
racial integration does not advance a compelling interest.313
Because of the greater disparity in the perceived quality of the
various schools in the district and the possibility that students may
face a choice between short commutes and quality schools, the Seattle
plan presents a closer case than does the JCPS plan. The Seattle
plan’s use of race would be less suspect if the district were to reduce
314
the quality differences among its high schools. A system of equal
schools should not be required before government may use race in

311. Id. at 1212 (Bea, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at 1209.
313. Given that Grutter was decided in 2003, it is remarkable that Judge Bea describes the
decision as one of “two exceptions still standing” to “a landscape littered with rejected asserted
‘compelling interests’ requiring race-based determinations.” Id. at 1201.
314. I recognize that this is much easier said than done and that more funding is hardly
sufficient.
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order to advance integration, because one of the very reasons that
school districts pursue integration is to make their schools less
315
unequal. But this reality does not change the Court’s likely
judgment that requiring a student to attend a far inferior school (or to
endure a long commute in order to access a quality school) in part
because of the use of race imposes a substantial burden on the
individual. Regardless of whether one agrees with this view of the
matter, the Court’s decisions reflect sensitivity to such burdens.316
In any event, it does not appear that students in Seattle typically
must attend far inferior schools because of the District’s use of race.
Nor does it appear that they typically must endure long bus
commutes because of the use of race. If either occurred in particular
instances, or if certain students confronted acute tradeoffs between
commutes and quality, then an as-applied constitutional challenge
might lie. But for the reasons discussed, the Seattle plan on its face
likely meets the individualized consideration requirement appropriate
in this setting.
CONCLUSION
I began by defining the concept of individualized consideration
apart from any legal requirements. I then turned to these
requirements by engaging the Court’s equal protection decisions on
their own terms. I demonstrated that the primary concern animating
the Court’s imposition of a particular kind of individualized
consideration requirement in a given setting is its assessment of the
probable net effect of using racial criteria on balkanization in
America. The relationship I identified among anticipated
balkanization, individualized consideration, and the use of race as a
selection criterion should prove useful in analyzing instances of raceconscious decision making that have arisen in the past and that
undoubtedly will arise in the future.

315. See supra notes 202–08 and accompanying text (documenting the sensitivity of teacher
quality to the racial composition of a public school independent of other variables that affect
teacher quality, including school poverty).
316. The Court aside, defenders of voluntary integration plans should be concerned about
the individual burdens that such plans impose based on race. Even if one disagrees that the
burdensome use of racial criteria raises equality and fairness concerns in this context, such use
imperils the long-term viability of the plans. They cannot survive if large segments of a district’s
population find them unacceptable and the community is fueled by resentment. Cf. supra notes
96, 134 (stressing the importance of social acceptance in the context of court-ordered
desegregation plans).
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Focusing on the present, I next examined how the Court’s
concern about balkanization plays out in the context of raceconscious student assignment plans. I suggested that the stakes are
high for America because the central disagreement concerns which
elements of national identity should prevail in an instance of genuine
value conflict. Defenders of the plans conceive integration as the
enduring moral legacy of Brown, and they view living together across
racial and ethnic lines as critical if America is ever going to be the
kind of nation that it aspires to be. Many critics of the plans view
colorblindness—or, at a minimum, a repudiation of racial
classifications—as both the true legacy of Brown and the embodiment
of the sort of community that the nation should aspire to be
regardless of who associates with whom. Each side embraces
hallowed national ideals, and each of these ideals was “purchased at
the price of immeasurable human suffering.”317
After explaining why voluntary integration plans advance several
compelling interests, I recommended an individualized consideration
requirement that accords with the constitutional concerns underlying
past decisions. This form of individualized consideration is modest in
its demands because race-conscious assignment plans likely reduce
racial balkanization when they do not subordinate other
considerations to race in granting or denying student requests for
particular schools and do not impose substantial burdens. Under this
variant of individualized consideration, school districts may use racial
criteria in making assignments so long as race constitutes only one of
several factors, race does not predominate district-wide in disposing
of assignment or transfer requests, and the use of race does not
impose substantial burdens on individual students and families.
I have not purported to resolve this instance of acute value
conflict as an original matter. Rather, the standard I have proposed
reflects the constitutional concerns of the Rehnquist Court. It
believed simultaneously that America is a society “in which race
unfortunately still matters”318 and that we should “encourage the
transition to a society where race no longer matters.”319 If the Roberts
Court values fidelity to the Court’s past encounters with raceconscious state action, then the analysis I commend, or something like

317. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
318. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
319. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
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it, should guide its resolution of these potentially historic cases. If the
Roberts Court elects instead to forge a new path, then the foregoing
analysis will have provided a framework for assessing the magnitude
of the departure.

